Many Americans view Saddam Hussein as an ideological dictator.  Emerging evidence from captured Iraqi records stored digitally at the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), however, confirms the conclusion that Saddam was first and foremost a pragmatist.  Research by notable scholars, like Amatzia Baram, highlights Saddam’s willingness to adapt his behavior and his regime to gain an advantage.  For example, in 1993, when Iraq felt the full effects of the international embargo, Saddam announced the opening of his Faith Campaign, which would transform Iraq’s secular state to a more Islamic state in concert with the growing religiosity among Iraqis.  This ability to adapt in order to preserve power was continually employed by Saddam throughout his 24-year reign as President of Iraq.  One can further observe his pragmatism in a CRRC transcript of a 2001 meeting between Saddam and Ricardo Largone, President of the National Cuban Association, where they discuss Cuba’s recent economic turmoil (CRRC Record Number SH-PDWN-D-000-507).

From the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s until 2001, Cuba’s economy struggled. Tourism remained its primary source of income, while sugar cane production steadily decreased due to a shortage of replacement parts, fertilizers, pesticides, and petroleum, as well as an unmotivated workforce. Largone voiced these concerns during his meeting with Saddam, who urges Cuba to consider adopting a new, more capitalist, approach.

Saddam begins by first identifying the problem with Cuba’s agricultural collective system.  He states that when a farmer owns his own plot of land he has a higher incentive to care for his crop.  The farmer will ensure a good harvest if it feeds his chickens and cows, which, in turn, feed his family.  Consequently, the sense of ownership creates a cooperative amongst his family where everyone, even a child of six years old, will work on the farm.  Saddam continues:

“However, with a collective this does not happen, if a family member finds work that gives him a little extra, he takes it, as for the wife, she does not work in the fields because she has no share in the cooperative. And the farmer feeds his cow sugar cane secretly because the cow is his and the sugar cane belongs to a hundred other people, and the property is public, it is all there, but the quantity of sugar cane is not specifically known.”

Saddam attributes the lack of sugar production to the theory that, because workers do not own the land, they are more likely to steal from it and less likely to work hard to increase production. He goes on to describe how, over time, the Cuban population has grown out of their initial acceptance of the socialist command economy:

“At the beginning, when the Cuban revolution occurred and succeeded in 1959, the Cuban people were poor, with their dignity and nationalism stepped on. At that time if you told him he had one share out of ten, he accepted it because he had nothing else. So, he worked hard and was buoyed by the spirit of the new revolution so he was careful, enthusiastic and responsible with the country’s wealth as if it were his own, but after his stomach was full, and he was clothed, well, he started to look for a new kind of life… Now, he sees the government employee, busy with  the news of all the other employees, this one stole and this one abuses public funds and this one skipped work for a few hours because he is a party member. And he sees the occupation in movies and how the American family lives, and he sees the cars or hears about them, but he must live in his country. And if imperialism is as bad as he is told, he does not see those negatives… These generations seek a better situation and secretly, within their hearts, compare their condition and the condition of other systems that took a different road.“

According to Saddam, the new era of information had led Cubans to seek a better socioeconomic situation. At this point we begin to see Saddam’s pragmatism emerge. After identifying Cuba’s problem, Saddam proposes that Cuba consider adapting to its new situation to increase production. He states, “Therefore, if you lease out the land for a high price, that is appropriate for the income, then you will see that the production will double or more.” He is proposing that Cuba move to a more capitalist system.  Much like China has done over the past few years, Saddam stresses that Cuba should rethink the communist model and slowly make an attempt to move toward owning and farming private property.

It seems as though Cuba has begun to show the same pragmatism that kept Saddam in power. In the past couple of years, Cuba has begun to allow its citizens to own small businesses, it has given farmers new profit-incentives, and even allowed for ownership of private property. Although there are still many restriction imposed by the state, Cuba has begun to take Saddam’s pragmatic approach and learned to adapt to save its ailing economy. Analysts seeking to understand the durability of dictatorial rule in Cuba, Saddam’s Iraq, and elsewhere would do well to pay attention to dictators’ pragmatic behavior, not merely their ideological expressions.

By Isabelle Francois and Brett Swaney
Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

The relationship between Russia and NATO is in dire need of radical rethinking.  In the past two decades, the evolving security environment has provided opportunities for NATO and Russia to establish new levels of cooperation.  However, diverging perceptions continue to cause the relationship to stagnate.  Is this only a matter of “old thinking,” or is there more to the lack of genuine progress?

 For the better part of the last decade, Western analysts and decision makers shaping the NATO-Russia relationship have relentlessly drawn on stereotypes of Russia to explain their inability to engage with Moscow. For their part, meanwhile, Russian analysts and decision makers have referred to their inability to promote Russian interests in the framework of the post-Cold War European security architecture.  Thus much of NATO-Russia relations continues to be a remnant of the Cold War, and these ties to the past regularly suppress creative thinking.

 One often hears of Russian stereotypes vis-à-vis the West. Their existence has been a quick and useful explanation for some Western observers who decided that Russia was trapped in the past and thus couldn’t be dealt with effectively.  Referring to stereotypes comforts those who believe that only time – if that — will permit cooperation with Russia, and that only patience will ultimately prevail, as if we were contending just with an issue of generational change.  However, twenty years after the end of the Cold War, this approach seems not only outdated, but essentially of little use to explain the limits of today’s NATO-Russia relations. Yet this analysis continues to inform inadequate Western policy choices.

 The problem with stereotypes is that they pretend to explain everything but, more often than not, these spurious variables explain nothing.  For instance, stereotypes may explain how 32% of Russians polled still perceive NATO as an enemy in 2011[1], according to data obtained from the Levada Center.  Yet, how does one explain the fact that, at the same time, 39% say that they desire cooperation with NATO on issues of general security? [2] 

 It is tempting to resort to stereotypes to account for the precipitous drop in Russian opinion when it comes to strengthening ties with the West, which fell from 75% in 2007 to 57% in 2008 following the Georgian War.  Western analysts may indeed interpret this as a typical knee jerk of old Soviet ambitions to exert hegemony.[3]They and Western policy-makers all too often turn to stereotypes to fill the void created by lack of an adequate explanation for what could be misguided perceptions when, in fact, deeper issues of Russian self-perception are in play.  Indeed, there are more fundamental forces at work than a stereotypical explanation of Russian intransigence rooted in old thinking.      

Certainly, human beings are creatures of habit, inimical to change; in the context of NATO-Russia, switching from an image of “arch enemy,” which separated NATO from the Soviet Union, to that of a (potential) partner and friend in the post-Cold War period have not gone very far. 

 Of course, stereotypes are always present in society, but so too are change and creative thinking – or at least the potential is there. For example, reliance on old stereotypes certainly does not explain the 2002 vision developed by then President Vladimir Putin and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, which led to the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) – a vision yet to be implemented, but a vision nonetheless.  This agreement led to two years of serious cooperation in a decade that was otherwise marked by a lack of trust and progress.  One could argue that these were two visionary men who perhaps came too early for their time, while their contemporaries could not shake off stereotypical views inherited from decades of Cold War.  It may just be, however, that the success of this vision — if only for a few years – was rooted in a smart political analysis which offered Russia an equal voice around the NATO table, restoring some pride to a country that lost the Cold War and thus breaking away from the past.

 Russians were clearly dealt a significant psychological shock with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Out of the chaotic post Cold-War period, the first post-Soviet generation to come of age in the mid 90′s did so at time when Russia was experiencing unprecedented declines in economic, military, and social power.  The Soviet – read “Russian” — sphere of influence contracted dramatically, and the stability and security of millions of people were undermined by inflation, corruption, and a dramatic loss of national prestige.  The disillusionment, frustration, and loss of identity in the 90′s skewed Russian perceptions of NATO, as a prominent symbol of Western primacy. 

It should not be surprising that those who won the Cold War – in the West – find it easier to be partners than those who had to accept losing.  Indeed, there can be little doubt that Russians’ pride – or assaults on that pride – has played a more decisive role in their seemingly lukewarm embrace of the West than have stereotypes. 

 Moreover, stereotypes are of little use in explaining the anti-Western sentiments among Russian youth.  Polls clearly show that both the lack of support for NATO-Russia cooperation and the negative reactions toward NATO’s role and policies are just as preeminent — if not more important – within young generations in Russia as among older generations.

In the midst of the frustration of the 90′s, Russia also suffered the collapse of its national ideology.  To fill the void, the government has turned to a renewed and redefined concept of Russian nationalism.  Nowadays, Russian textbooks and teacher manuals downplay Stalin-era repression and praise Putin’s role in “restoring Russia’s sovereignty” in a U.S.-dominated international order.  In higher education, Russian scholarship increasingly points to Russia’s leading international role and celebrates Russia’s unique cultural-religious heritage.[4] 

 The overall message presents the Soviet era as a more attractive vision than the chaos of the recent past.  With this message comes a resurgent belief that Russia should be an international power to be feared – or at least respected — by other nations.  Russian youths are thus encouraged to value elements of their national history that, in turn, generates increasing levels of uneasiness in the West and points to Russia’s possible return to an assertive role abroad. These perceptions among Russian youth run the risk of heightening a level of xenophobia in Russia toward the West, as Russians attempt to chart a unique path back to great power status.[5] This perception of Russia’s return to great power status is reflected again in polling conducted by the Levada Center, where a plurality of Russians, 45%, perceives Russia currently as a great power.  This has changed significantly from 1999 when only 19% of respondents viewed Russia as a great power.[6]  There is of course nothing inherently wrong in believing one’s nation to be a great power.  The challenge lies in the fact that 42% of Russians polled in 2011 felt there were grounds for the West and NATO to fear Russia as a result.[7]

 It is thus time to “retire” stereotypes as a poor explanation for the lack of progress in NATO-Russia relations, and start paying attention to explanations rooted in Russian self-perception and the pride of Russian citizens.  Certainly, understanding the Russian mentality is fundamental to devising smart policies.  The complexity of Russian self-perception may actually assist policy-makers in explaining and making best use of some positive trends.  For instance, support for mutually beneficial ties with the West has increased from 46% in 1998 to 74% in 2011.[8]  Yet these gains are fragile and will require nurturing by both sides in order to improve mutual understanding, in the hope of making progress in future cooperation. 

 Exposing the flaws of stereotypes in explaining the lack of progress in NATO-Russia relations over the past twenty years points toward the value of a different approach to engaging with Russia.  It is not simply an issue of waiting for the next generation.  One should also caution against expecting very much out of increased information sharing on NATO’s role and policies and additional public diplomacy efforts on NATO-Russia cooperation.  It is perhaps less an issue of “debunking myths” about NATO in Russia, than an issue of reaching out to Russia by first understanding the impact of Russian self-perception.  

By Peter Flory, Distinguished Senior Visiting Fellow
Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS)

Author’s Note:  This article was written at the request of the editors of INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, who asked for an American perspective for their forum on “Alliance Partners on Bundeswehr Reform”  (“Buendnispartner zur Bundeswehrreform”).  The original appears in INTERNATIONALE POLITIK 6/2011, with additional articles by British, German and French authors.

In the May 2011 German Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG), Germany sets as its goal a force that is capable of “[s]afe guarding national interests, assuming international responsibility, and shaping security together.”  [All quotations in this article are from the 2011 DPG.]  As an American, I would ask no more and no less from our German ally.

More broadly, that means a modern military force, capable of meeting Germany’s responsibilities in the face of ongoing challenges in Afghanistan and the Greater Middle East and complex and evolving threats such as ballistic missile and cyber attack, in the framework of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept.  To meet these tasks requires a Bundeswehr with certain attributes – not all of them military.

First, Germany needs to field a Bundeswehr that is capable.  In the words of the DPG, that means a military able to “make[] an adequate contribution to safeguarding our security interests in accordance with German’s role and economic power in the international community.”  Practically, that means forces that are adequate in number, well trained for modern missions, well-equipped, deployable, sustainable and interoperable with the forces of Germany’s NATO allies.

In this regard, the steps announced to reshape German armed forces and meet Germany’s stringent budget cutting goals are cause for concern for the U.S. and NATO, especially at a time when other leading European powers are also scaling back their capabilities.  Moving to an all-professional force and increasing deployable forces to 10,000 soldiers are important and welcome steps, politically as well as militarily.  But reducing to a military of 175,000, while cutting equipment and force modernization, risks losing critical mass in important areas, and imperils the DPG goal of a full spectrum force that provides a “reliable and credible” contribution to NATO.  The issue is not simply military – the DPG recognizes the need to ensure that Germany’s contributions suffice to ensure appropriate influence and a German “say in planning and decisions.”  (Another way in which Germany can exercise leadership is through continued robust participation in multinational programs like Alliance Ground Surveillance and new Smart Defense initiatives.)

Underlying capability is the question of defense spending — a sensitive topic, especially when Germany is being asked to sustain a burdensome leadership role within the Euro zone.  But Americans too face tough choices to reduce spending and reboot the American economy, as well as aging populations and other social needs .  As Secretary Gates said, American political leaders and taxpayers may question why they should spend over 5 percent of GDP on defense when other nations spending far less make further cuts in their defense budgets.  So it is critical for Germany to return to more robust levels of defense spending as soon as possible.

If one goal of investment in Germany’s defense forces is to “secure Germany’s capacity to act in the field of foreign policy,” another must be to bolster the capacity to act quickly and responsively.  So flexibility is another critical element of what I would hope to see in the Bundeswehr, in particular, the ability to be deployed quickly and ready to carry out the full range of missions in complex and sometimes ambiguous situations.  Flexibility in this sense is not a question of military deployability.  It is a question of a flexible legal framework, and a responsive political system that can make difficult decisions to join with allies on behalf of common security and shared values.

German policy on out-of-area deployment of armed forces has evolved substantially and positively since the fall of the Berlin Wall and early debates over German engagement in the Balkans.  But as the missed opportunity in Libya shows, Germany still has difficulty with the role of military force in international relations.  Widely-reported caveats on German soldiers in Afghanistan (later reduced) were an important source of political friction and frustration for NATO commanders charged with ensuring a cohesive Allied military effort.  It would be unfortunate if these were remembered longer than Germany’s many sacrifices and contributions in the ISAF mission.  Like other Americans, I admire Germany’s determination not to forget the past, but like other Americans – and I believe, Europeans as well – I see Germany today as a normal country whose past should no longer stand in the way of helping build a more secure future.

Ultimately, the key to a capable and flexible Bundeswehr is continuing evolution in a German political class and society that in many cases remain skeptical of German military ambition, and undervalue the tremendous contribution the German military has made to the country’s security and prosperity, and yes, the peace that Germany and Europe have enjoyed since the terrible first half of the 20^th century.

Support for Germany’s men and women in uniform can manifest itself in several ways.  First, public and political support for adequate defense budgets is a critical element in developing and maintaining capable German forces who can contribute to German and international security.

Stronger popular and political support for an active and engaged German security policy is another prerequisite.  The important role of the Bundestag in approving out-of-area operations will remain, as the DPG states, an “indispensable basis of German security policy.”  As a former U.S. Congressional staffer, I understand the importance of public and parliamentary support for security and defense policies.  But in a world of complex and often fast-breaking crises, I also understand the importance of freedom of action for elected leaders seeking to meet Germany’s “international responsibility for peace and freedom.”

Lastly, the DPG recognizes the need for greater appreciation for the unique demands of military service.  Legislation now before the Bundestag to assist wounded veterans and their families is an important step.  But military service involves not only well-understood risks to lives and safety, but also less-appreciated risks, for example the risk, in some operations, of inadvertently causing civilian casualties.  In these cases, solidarity between citizen and soldier requires a review of laws and policies to ensure these provide German soldiers with the legal and moral support they deserve as they carry out their difficult tasks.

Peter Flory is Distinguished Senior Visiting Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and a member of the Strategic Advisors Group of the Atlantic Council.  He served as Assistant Secretary General of NATO for Defense Investment from 2007 to 2010, and from 2005 to 2006, was U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.  This article reflects his personal views.

By Stefano Santamato, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

With NATO leadership focused on the current challenges of Libya, Afghanistan and resource constraints, the agenda for next years’ Chicago Summit (May 20-21, 2012) looks pretty full already. However, today’s burning issues cannot overshadow yesterday’s commitments and tomorrow’s challenges.

At Lisbon, NATO Heads of State and Government adopted the new Strategic Concept setting out NATO’s transformation from Cold War monolith to a flexible, multidimensional crisis management organization. The Strategic Concept vision of a 21st-century NATO matched modern challenges to the need for state-of-the art organization and response capabilities.

To give meaning to this mandate, a brand new Emerging Security Challenges (ESC) Division was created at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The ESC Division deals with nuclear weapons proliferation, terrorism, cyber threats, energy security, and fundamental environmental problems. Far from implying that these challenges were somehow “new”, the establishment of the ESC Division not only reaffirmed NATO’s love affair with convoluted acronyms but, more substantially, it acknowledged that in a complex world of wicked security problems, no serious or effective security organization – national or international – can be static, un-dynamic, or less than vigilant.

The new ESC Division has achieved a few early successes. In what amounted to a shift in NATO culture, the Strategic Analysis Capability jettisoned the traditional “reactive” approaches for approaches emphasizing crisis assessment and anticipation. In June 2011, a new NATO policy on cyber defense was approved by the defense ministers of the North Atlantic Council. Thanks partly to the leadership of the United States – and to the personal involvement of then Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn – and thanks partly to the diplomatic skills of the newly appointed Assistant Secretary General for ESC, Ambassador Gábor Iklódy, the NATO Allies defined a new NATO role in cyber defense based on coordination, prevention and resilience. (1)

However, all is not well. Kurt Volker – the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and committed Atlanticist – argued in Foreign Policy (2) how NATO’s operation in Libya exposed four sets of “deep-rooted” challenges for the Alliance: 1) defining the mission; 2) providing leadership; 3) ensuring execution; and 4) maintaining solidarity.

His analysis is both accurate and timely and applies not only to the Libya response but to NATO’s ESC approach as well. Here, I would like to build on Volker’s four categories and advocate for a number of actions NATO should undertake in the arena of Emerging Security Challenges.

Defining the mission. In spite of its promising launch, a coherent vision of NATO’s mission in countering ESC remains unclear. NATO needs to formulate a Mission Statement, one that translates the vision of the new Strategic Concept into an operational mandate that ensures a cohesive approach to ESC based on four principles: anticipation, cooperation, prevention, and resilience.

The ESC’s Mission Statement is the glue that holds together the various strands of NATO’s activities dealing with emerging challenges. It is the blueprint for responding to them and for identifying the “must have” capabilities to counter them. NATO needs one. And in doing so, NATO should identify when and where its role will be as leader, supporting, or simply filling a heavily-specialized capability gap.

Providing leadership. To ensure mission success, NATO must provide two kinds of leadership: internal and external.

Within NATO, the ESC Division should lead on all aspects of policy and implementation. While this may appear obvious, it is of particular importance given that there is no common threat perception among NATO Allies as to the nature, importance, and immediacy of individual emerging challenges.

Externally, NATO should encourage national ESC “champions,” e.g., Poland on energy security; Norway on climate change. Where the United States has led in the development of the NATO cyber-defense policy, other NATO countries should play a similar lead role for NATO’s counter-terrorism, environmental security, and non-proliferation policies.

Internal leadership and national ownership are not contradicting concepts. They ensure policy coherence and national “buy into” NATO’s role in countering emerging challenges.

Ensuring execution. Ultimately, the success of NATO in dealing with ESC resides in its ability to contribute to successful Alliance responses. In this respect, the new ESC Division should focus on partner outreach and operational capabilities.

Concerning outreach, the ESC Division is the point of contact – the primary area of engagement and cooperation – with NATO’s partners and with other international organizations, first and foremost the European Union. NATO may not lead in all cases, however, and should adapt accordingly.

Given the non-military nature of many of the emerging challenges, NATO’s ESC Division is also well suited to serve as the operational interface between the Alliance members and their individual national and international partners, e.g., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, law enforcement agencies, and private industry.

As a multi-agency interface, NATO is increasingly perceived, and appreciated, as an enabler of Alliance operations. The ability of the ESC Division, in particular, to access to capabilities of 28 nations – be that information and expertise, command and control, or hardware – is invaluable and success here will be a litmus test of NATO’s enduring contribution to the Alliance response to emerging challenges.

Concerning capabilities, the ESC Division should take full advantage of the opportunities and structures of NATO’s only non-military discipline, Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). Through CEP structures, ESC can reach out to multiple civil disciplines and specialties, such as transports, telecommunications or emergency management and first responders. By integrating NATO’s CEP with ESC, NATO could have a potent and wide-ranging set of capabilities.

In addition, working closely with NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (Norfolk, VA), the ESC Division can, I believe, effectively integrate policy into NATO’s Defense Planning Process and translate policy into capability requirements for ESC.

Maintaining solidarity. The final – and possibly most difficult challenge – for the new ESC Division is to preserve Alliance solidarity. There is no easy or straight forward solution to this problem.

Very early in the debate on NATO’s new Strategic Concept, Ally positions differed – in some cases dramatically – on what emerging threat or challenge would constitute “Article 5 material.” (3)  Some advocated unconditional Alliance solidarity, while others cautioned against engaging even in “consultations” under NATO’s Article 4. (4)  This is not to imply, however, that these divergences represent a lack of Alliance cohesion. Rather they denote – and reemphasize – the self-evident and undeniable difficulty NATO Allies have in defining the nature, impact and traceability of emerging challenges.

Once again, NATO’s approach to cyber defense is illustrative. It provides a useful model of de facto adoption of a “flexible response” approach, one that is not overly burdened by specific thresholds or threat lists. Alliance solidarity is a qualitative concept, not a quantitative one. NATO knows – as do its adversaries – when and how NATO will respond to threats and attacks and that it will respond at flexible, adaptable, and appropriate levels.

While individual Allies perceive challenges differently – and appreciate this diversity – they recognize that they – and the emerging challenges they face – are interrelated. Each Ally, therefore, is compelled to support – politically and operationally – NATO’s “visible assurance” in this area of emerging challenges as a contribution to its own and to collective security.

Conclusion. Given the nature of uncertainty, the ever emerging, ever changing, international security challenges can never accurately be foreseen or predicted. To passively submit, however, to this dynamic – to rely solely on ad-hoc contingencies if and as needed – is sheer folly.

The true measure of NATO’s success is its tested framework and adaptability – as represented by the ESC Division – to respond to the new and multiple ESCs. Most of these ESCs are either non-military and/or national in nature. NATO, however, recognizes that, given its experience, capabilities and constituency, it has a role to play in addressing them. The question is what role? We have the form, we need the substance. Vision, action and leadership are required and discussion of these critical elements should be, at minimum, on the informal Chicago agenda.

References:
1.  NATO and Cyber Defense – NATO Website – http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_78170.htm 

2. Kurt Volker: “Don’t Call It a Comeback – Four reasons why Libya doesn’t equal success for NATO” – in Foreign Policy – August 23, 2011.

3.  Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”- Source NATO Official texts – http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

4. Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened – Ibid.

Stefano Santamato is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow for the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (NDU-INSS). Mr. Santamato may be contacted at s.santamato.ctr@ndu.edu.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

By Mark D. Ducasse
Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Libya illustrated that some NATO Allies are more willing to become involved in NATO operations than others. To some extent, this has always been a facet of Alliance operations, but never has such intra-Alliance discord been played out so overtly in the build-up to military operations. At the strategic-level, the North Atlantic Council sanctioned the Alliance’s actions in Libya by reaching – or rather not breaking – “consensus” of all 28 NATO nations. However, at the operational level, we witnessed a split between those nations willing to carry out their operational requirements and share mission responsibilities and those that were not. The subsequent operation in Libya inaugurated a new, more flexible approach to operations, closer to a “coalition of the willing,” composed of both NATO members and external partners. With this in mind, in an alliance based around the notion of political solidarity and shared responsibilities, is such an external division of Alliance responsibilities detrimental to the overall cohesion and longevity of NATO?

During the Cold War, NATO had one essential mission: to deter or – if need be – counter any possible attack emanating from the Soviet Union upon the territory of its members. NATO’s Cold War mission was full-spectrum in nature and would have required capabilities of all Alliance members as they simultaneously combined offensive, defensive, and continuity of civil society operations against aggression emanating from the Warsaw Pact. This mission was one borne out of “collective-defense” and the NATO Treaty’s Article 5. Today, NATO has moved away from its Cold War “collective-defense” attitude, implying a solely military posture, to an alliance based around the notion of “collective-security,” incorporating new mission sets, external partners and whole of government approaches to better and more flexibly fulfill the security requirements of its members. Such mission diversity, however, demands continued input and possible specialization by NATO members, in addition to a clearly-defined process for the institutionalization of operational lessons learnt.

Today, NATO’s areas of operation are more diversified than ever. The Alliance has moved away from a single mission tied almost entirely to the European continent during the Cold War, and is now potentially even farther afield than the area of operations used to redefine NATO’s role during the early post-Cold War era. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept brought Alliance strategy up-to-date and addressed the Alliance’s ability to project globally. In this document, the Allies reiterated the centrality of the Alliance’s traditional Article 5 collective-defense mission. The Allies added crisis management and cooperative security to form three core-tasks for NATO in the twenty-first century. The Alliance today is performing such missions simultaneously on three separate continents: Europe, Africa, and Asia. These include stability and security assistance operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan; counter-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden and East Africa; and offensive military operations and humanitarian protection/assistance in Libya.

It is these new missions that are raising potential political divisions among the various Allies. Nations are increasingly going “á la carte,” choosing which missions to be become involved with and which to avoid. Unsurprisingly, those missions which allied nations are choosing to participate in are closer to their own national interests rather than to a single unifying full-spectrum mission of the Cold War era (1).  This picking and choosing exacerbates existing capabilities gaps and interoperability issues faced by NATO at the operational level, in addition to damaging the overall notion of Alliance solidarity at the strategic level. NATO’s operational experiences in Libya, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia highlight two clear and growing questions in relation to future NATO operations: First, how can a decision endorsed by multiple nations not include or imply the equal sharing of burdens towards the implementation of this consensus? And second, what effects will the discrepancy between strategic-level political consensus and tactical-level force and burden allocation have on the global projection of the Alliance and NATO’s fulfillment of its three core tasks?

I believe that NATO must project itself globally in order to truly address the international threat environment of today. Today, NATO must be capable of dealing with crisis management and its traditional Article 5 mission not only within Europe, but also abroad, with the countering of conventional and asymmetrical threats emanating from North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the wider Middle East. The Alliance must continue its post-Cold War mission of expansion and the external projection of power. The Alliance should also ensure adequate resources for non-Article 5 expeditionary operations. Such resources are not only dependent on political commitment, but require the physical allocation of capabilities to ensure that such operations are interoperable, flexible and, most importantly, rapidly deployable outside of NATO’s traditional European area of operations. This will enable the Alliance to better meet and protect its members from the new and dynamic security challenges they face today.

However, with this new global mission, Alliance members must share the risks at every level, as well as the burdens, responsibilities, and successes. If NATO is to maintain a viable and expeditionary alliance that fulfils the security requirements and cost-benefit analysis of all its members, then the Allies need to divide tasks and operations fairly among themselves based on relative capabilities and specialties. The Allies should not, however, divide the responsibility for Alliance goals, missions, or implementation of the 2010 Strategic Concept. Doing so will undermine the notion of shared responsibilities and ownership by all 28 nations of NATO operations. All Allies must make meaningful contributions to future joint operations, taking joint ownership and demonstrating their political solidarity to each other and the Alliance through the development, deployment and sustainment of these contributions. And though the Alliance structure creates a “pool” of standardization and interoperability from which coalitions of willing nations and external partners can easily form, the overall cohesion and direction of NATO is not something nations can pick and choose from when it suits their own individual interests. All Allies must bear a fair share of the burden towards the implementation of Alliance consensus.

The Allies must reach consensus as to the future strategy of their out-of-area operations and the capabilities they – as an alliance – are lacking or are willing to share in this regard. I contend that more planning and research about future threats must also be done, including a study into the projected effects the end of ISAF in 2014 will have on the Alliance, and a clear strategy in relation to North Africa and external partnerships. This research will help mitigate the future creation of ad-hoc coalitions outside of the traditional NATO structure and will also serve to highlight the capabilities needed to deal with future scenarios, the cluster of Allies that possess these capabilities and any gaps in capabilities therein.

Worries about the individual capabilities of Allies has always been a problem of the Alliance, but now, with declining defense budgets and reevaluations of security requirements and political interests, this worry has now changed to concern over the future cohesion of the Alliance as a whole. Policymakers (particularly in Europe) must pay serious attention to this unfair division of responsibilities, keeping an open mind to notions such as burden-sharing and the pooling of Alliance resources in order to mitigate dependency on a single or cluster of nations and more fairly share the responsibilities across the whole Alliance. In particular, the United States must seek an answer to the question of how it can lessen the heavy reliance placed on it by its Allies and yet still remain a committed partner within the Alliance.

History – and circumstances – has shown that America needs partners and that these partners can be found in Europe. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the Alliance lost its “other;” the clear and unifying opponent that helped embolden the Allies in fulfillment of their shared responsibilities and roles. The post-Cold War era is witnessing a growing bifurcation in relation to the political interests of the Allies and the role they envisage for NATO in fulfillment of their respective security requirements. This discord ranges from tactical-level questions concerning how to conduct relations with Russia and China, missile defense and nuclear issues, relations with the Middle East and North Africa, the countering of international terrorism; to fundamental questions such as under what circumstances should the Alliance invoke Article 5 and whether nations will actually provide capabilities for Article 5 missions if it were invoked. Such bifurcation and uncertainty as to intra-Alliance solidarity and the overall direction of the Alliance is not to the betterment of NATO. The Allies need to play on the successes of the Alliance, using this time of global austerity and defense cuts to push forward and institutionalize the notion of burden-sharing, specialization, and resource-pooling to the Allies at the upcoming 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, IL. Only then will NATO serve as true toolbox to its members, one ready and adaptable and deployable to deal with current and future security challenges its members may face.

Mr. Mark D. Ducasse is the Principal Research Analyst for the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (NDU-INSS). Mr. Ducasse may be contacted at (202) 685-0820 or mark.ducasse.ctr@ndu.edu.  

Endnotes:

[1] Of course, even during the Cold War, not all the Allies would have been involved in all aspects of combat, had deterrence failed. The essential difference between then and now is that, in the Cold War, all the Allies were politically committed to the same key goal; on this, they did not divide, as is sometimes the case now.

By Mark Ducasse and Stefano Santamato
Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

Ten years after 9/11, nine months before the NATO Summit in Chicago, and four weeks after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Tripoli, discussions over resources and capabilities are overshadowing the transformational nature of NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the operational successes of the Alliance. Lately, too much focus is being placed on a mercantile approach to NATO by which the value of the Alliance is seemingly measured, almost exclusively, in terms of input versus output. This approach, sound in accounting terms, does not bode well for statesmanship or international alliances. It is time to change the course and the discourse.

Even in these challenging times of financial pressures and operational fatigue, the debate over NATO’s role, relevance and resources needs to be, first and foremost, a political one. The history of NATO is one of solidarity, not of an internal balance of capabilities. Burden sharing has always been a feature of NATO’s compact, yet it has never defined the Alliance. The “transatlantic bargain” – if there ever was one – was political not financial. The universal message that Article 5 has sent to the world for more than sixty years is that “…an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all…”

It is mainly because of this message of unqualified solidarity that NATO continues to be the world’s most successful political-military alliance. During the Cold War, the essence of Article 5 laid in the double bluff of the United States’ nuclear umbrella – of its readiness to sacrifice “Chicago for Hamburg” – and of the misunderstanding that an “armed attack” would be countered by an equally, if not superior, purely armed response. In reality, as scholars and close observers know all too well, the three musketeer clause represented by Article 5 is more nuanced, and the Allied nations would stand all for one and one for all only to take such actions each of them would “deem necessary” to restore peace and security in the North Atlantic area. The use of armed force, while specifically mentioned by Article 5, only represents a possible option the Allies are ready to resort to.

However, this reinforces the view that no matter what the Allies’ response to a possible attack on one or more of them would have been, Article 5 would be the right answer, as it had been after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The speed with which the Allies then agreed, unanimously, to invoke Article 5 stands as a monument to the transatlantic relationship. Against this definitive show of solidarity the discussion over the nature of the attack – armed or not – and on the level of individual or collective response, becomes less relevant.

With its new Strategic Concept, agreed at its Lisbon summit in 2010, NATO has redefined its mandate, vis-à-vis collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. The Alliance also reaffirmed its core values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Between the two, the core of the Alliance’s strength is still represented by the recognition of the centrality of the Allies’ unchanging bond of solidarity. However, as demonstrated by the Allies’ reaction to the 9/11 attacks, this bond has both evolved in nature and acquired new relevance in the post-Cold War world.

NATO’s primary challenge remains one of political unity rather than one of burden sharing. Alliance members face a plethora of unconventional, asymmetrical, and transnational threats to their security. These threats include, among others, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, cyber attacks, disruptions to energy supplies, and mass migration. The perceived threat posed by these examples varies among the Allies, together with their understanding of the role NATO should play in dealing with them.

The new Strategic Concept has very ably mastered the ensuing centrifugal forces by identifying NATO’s three essential tasks to allow all of its members to recognize that, in the Alliance’s mandate, the best way to address their vital security interests is through either collective defense, crisis management, or promoting international security through cooperation.

Equally skillful has been the way the drafters of the new Strategic Concept have ensured the continuity of the solidarity bond by reframing the essence of Article 5 in its Preface and by redefining the scope of collective defense. By introducing the concept of threat to the “fundamental security” of an individual Ally or of the Alliance as a whole, NATO members have underscored their commitment to the spirit of Article 5 and recognized that a threat to the fundamental security of an individual Ally “rests in the eye of the beholder” and need not necessarily entail exclusively an “armed attack.”

As Operation Unified Protector in Libya demonstrated, NATO remains the only viable and effective political-military organization. Through this operations, the Allies’ capability shortfalls have become visible to a considerable degree because people have started writing more often about them, not because they did not exist before; whilst concurrently, the operational flexibility of and success of the Alliance have quietly increased. Article 5 however, remains the cornerstone that holds NATO together and ensures that democracy, security, flexibility, and mutual understanding continue to spread even if the original threat this alliance was envisioned to counter has long since receded.

During the Cold War, the prevailing threat perception, like a light shining through a lens, was clear and focused in one direction: the Soviet Union. In today’s threat environment, the light is shining through a prism, displaying multiple threats with differing levels of complexity, emanating from and ending at various points, all requiring tailored reactions. What is and is not an Article 5 threat may be more confusing than ever, and deciding that point will require significant consultation and discussion, in order to create consensus among the Alliance’s members.

NATO has evolved from an organization embodying largely military goals conceived in relation to a single threat, and become an alliance regarded as a community of countries sharing common values with the promotion of good governance at its core. The Alliance is moving away from the “collective defense” doctrine of deterring potential aggression with military force alone, to one of “collective security,” involving active conflict prevention via increased cooperation, flexibility and solidarity among members and non-members alike. Article 5 has transformed itself into a conduit through which a new understanding of solidarity can flourish. In these uncertain times, the continuation of a proven alliance that acts as a forum for dialogue and as a tool for crisis management will remain of key importance to the security requirements of its members well into the twenty-first century.

Mr. Mark Ducasse is the Principal Research Analyst for the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (NDU-INSS);  Mr. Stefano Santamato is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow also at CTSS. Mr. Ducasse may be contacted at (202) 685-0820 or mark.ducasse.ctr@ndu.edu. Mr. Santamato may be contacted on (202) 433-9661 or s.santamato.ctr@ndu.edu.      

POINTS:

*  The Libyan “Operation Unified Protector” (OUP) was wrongly presented as the sign of an Alliance in trouble.  It may become the symbol of American success in convincing its Allies that Europeans had to take a greater share of the burden and assume greater responsibility for security in Europe and its periphery.

* NATO should prepare for a strategy review on Libya in the context of the 2012 Chicago Summit.  This would be an opportunity to highlight Allied capabilities to conduct a limited model of intervention – short term UN-mandated “bridging missions” from an open crisis to political settlement, aimed at a 6 month stabilization period prior to reconstruction efforts.

* Associating old and new partners to a NATO strategy review of OUP in Chicago would showcase the non-Allied contributions, both militarily and in terms of the political support provided by countries in the region, without which the operation would not have had the required political legitimacy in the first place. 

The public debate that surrounded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–led operation in Libya gave an impression of an Alliance in trouble. There is, however, a good story to tell. The United States, as the host of the May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, may wish to present the case for a new type of operation and call for a strategy review on Libya in order to develop a balanced approach to Allies’ possible contributions to stability in North Africa and the Gulf region.

NATO Inherited Libya

In the spring of 2011, dramatic events unfolded in the southern rim of the Mediterranean. Countries from Egypt to Libya were swept by significant popular uprising and political change. The events led to regional upheaval and ultimately armed conflict, resulting in a NATO-led operation in Libya. Following serious unrest, which began in Benghazi on February 17, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1970, which instituted an arms embargo, froze the personal assets of Libya’s leaders, and imposed a travel ban on senior figures. NATO stepped up its surveillance operations in the Central Mediterranean. NATO Defense Ministers met on March 10 and supported the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to have Alliance ships move to the same area in order to boost the monitoring efforts.

On March 17, the UN adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing member states and regional organizations to inter alia take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians in Libya. NATO members immediately followed the UN call by launching a NATO-led operation to enforce the arms embargo against Libya on March 23. In addition, on March 24, NATO decided to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya given the UNSC resolution call for a ban on all flights except those for humanitarian and aid purposes to avoid air attacks from Libyan authorities perpetrated on civilians inside the country. Finally, on March 27, following intense internal debates, NATO agreed to accept the whole military operation in Libya under UNSCR 1973, taking over from a coalition led by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, which had intervened militarily in the early days of the Libyan crisis with the first airstrikes on March 19, 2011. (1)

The purpose of the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector has been to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. NATO took action as part of a broad international effort, and immediately indicated its desire to work with its partners in the region. The NATO-led operation had the necessary legal basis through UNSCR 1973 to intervene militarily. Moreover, the support from the Arab League provided the necessary political legitimacy to intervene.

In this context, NATO was able to consult with and get some concrete support from countries in the region. Allies were able to make best use of partnership frameworks, notably the Mediterranean Dialogue with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Allies reached out to all their partners, including in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to share information, ensure transparency, and give an opportunity to willing contributing nations to provide assets to the operation. Three partners have contributed militarily to the operation to date, notably with aircraft from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar from the Gulf region, as well as Sweden among the Partnership for Peace partners. In addition, some staff support was provided by Jordan, while Malta assisted the Alliance in its operations both at sea and in the air. Others have landed their political support, enhancing the legitimacy of the operation. The partnership with Gulf countries developed significantly within a few months, and should be built upon to institutionalize the level of cooperation reached between NATO and some Gulf countries.

Post-operation Libya

NATO’s engagement in Libya, despite its sound legal and political basis, has faced significant challenges in terms of internal cohesion, as well as external pressure on the Alliance in light of the summer stalemate. The mandate for operation was renewed by NATO Defense Ministers on June 8 for another 3 months until the end of September (2).  Despite various bilateral efforts and attempts between the forces of Muammar Qadhafi and the rebels from the Transitional National Council (TNC), a negotiated settlement was impossible. Taking over Tripoli in mid-August, the TNC will have to prepare for transition in Libya in order to ensure inclusive political representation in future government institutions and the electoral process, as well as to guarantee territorial integrity. This will no doubt take months and NATO will remain engaged abiding by its commitments until the TNC decides on—and international community supports—the requirements after the operation ends.

Since the situation in Libya will remain volatile, NATO should prepare for a strategy review on Libya in the context of the 2012 Chicago Summit. The Alliance may no longer be in the lead when it comes to the Libyan transition by May 2012, but it will still have lessons to learn and to share. Moreover, NATO will have a role to play in support of stability and reconstruction in Libya and the region. It would also be useful to continue to engage with the regional partners and develop closer cooperation, notably in the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Lessons Learned

Following the widely reported speech by outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in June 2011, many interpreted the remarks as evidence of a decaying Alliance in the face of a new challenge in Libya (3).  (Others, however, heard the speech as a wake-up call.) Operation Unified Protector was used as a prime example of NATO’s inability—after “11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country”—to keep up with requirements of modern warfare. Criticisms were also leveled because only a small number of Allies (eight) contributed to the strike operation. Key European members, such as Germany, fundamentally disagreed with the mission and rendered the European Union (EU) unable to contribute much more than humanitarian aid and sanctions against the Qadhafi regime. Despite what can be interpreted at the end of August 2011 as a qualified success for the Alliance in Libya, NATO continues to suffer from a public image deficit in many quarters, and nations may have to consider how much transformation is likely to be sufficient for the Alliance to be able to “re-brand” its image.

The Libyan operation has faced the usual challenge of maintaining consensus within the Alliance as time went by without a political settlement in place. From the early days of consultation within NATO, differences of approach and diverging political interests on the part of various Allies (notably France, Germany, and Turkey) did not escape media attention. In June, consensus was challenged following the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers: On June 22, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini called for a suspension of the campaign in the face of civilian casualties in the wake of NATO air strikes necessary for humanitarian aid to reach people—a reversal of position confirmed a couple of days later by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. At an EU summit on June 24, Berlusconi pushed for a final solution to the Libyan crisis. That said, for as long as public opinion was supportive of Allies’ military engagement against Qadhafi forces, consensus within NATO was likely to be maintained.

It should be clear, however, that in the absence of a major threat to the Alliance, various interests on the part of member states will make “difficult consensus” the norm rather than the exception. Moreover, in most cases, as we have seen in the Balkans and now in Libya, NATO-led operations can count on only a limited number of contributing troops, which assume combat or strike roles, from member states to any given operation. As NATO transitioned to “out of area” operations, there is no requirement for all Allies to contribute to a NATO-led operation, and it should not come as a surprise when a number of them opt out. Such decisions, provided that they do not affect consensus and do not get in the way of the mission, are not undermining the Alliance; they may actually provide added flexibility for NATO to act and may prove to be the process by which most operations will be approved in future. This should not be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness on the part of the Alliance. NATO’s strength lies in its ability to manage the consensual basis for its military action irrespective of obvious differences often made public for internal purposes.

NATO’s dependence on the international community to move from a military operation to broader stabilization and reconstruction efforts is yet another key challenge and its comprehensive approach to crisis management. Operation Unified Protector has shown progress in terms of NATO partnerships with other international and regional organizations, and has reached out quickly and decisively to various partners in the region. However, Alliance strategic success has depended on the ability of the international community to deliver a political settlement, relying notably on the Libyan Contact Group set up in London in April 2011. Moreover, NATO will likely face a difficult transition from military operation to civilian efforts at reconstruction, once the UN and the international community have taken the lead on the basis of a still elusive final outcome in Libya.

A Good Story to Tell

For all the challenges facing a transforming Alliance, Operation Unified Protector is not a bad story to tell. It could actually be the tell tale sign of a winning transatlantic partnership for Allies’ publics—if the United States chooses to make the operation a deliverable at the Chicago Summit.

One of the key themes of the summit will be “smart defense”—that is, identifying capability areas where Allies need to keep investing and working multinationally to mitigate the decline in defense spending and to address some of the concerns raised by Secretary Gates last June. The Libya operation is not irrelevant to that debate as it outlined where NATO should focus in addition to frontline capabilities (4).  Although the operation has exposed military weaknesses on the part of Europe (nothing that was not already known), it has also shown that Europeans can project fighting power in complex operations and find the political will to take the lead.

Moreover, Operation Unified Protector tells the story of an Alliance yet unmatched in terms of its command and control capability and its flexibility and ability to conduct a complex operation. Perhaps even more importantly, NATO was the only organization with the political will to take over from the American, French, and British coalition in Libya, despite differences of views within the Alliance. Finally, Alliance capacity in terms of command and control was trusted by partners in the region to be able to run the operation, thereby gaining their political support.

In fact, the Libyan operation can be seen as the symbol of American success in convincing its Allies that Europeans had to take a greater share of the burden and assume greater responsibility for security in Europe and its periphery (5).  The operation was the first in which the United States agreed to play a pivotal but supporting role while Europeans took the lead. It is a prime example of American forces and assets being made available to Europeans through NATO as Allies lacked the necessary weapons and munitions to carry out the mission. The United States was indispensable to the operation; the supporting role came after America provided the initial heavy strikes and once Europeans finally agreed to do the heavy lifting. That is transatlantic partnership at its best.

The Libya operation has managed to identify what a limited model of intervention can be with a supporting yet indispensable role for the United States. It also outlines the type of support that European Allies are likely to need in today’s operations. This seems to indicate a clearer division of labor rather than an inability to act on the part of the Europeans or disengagement on the part of the United States. It also corresponds to the burden-sharing requirements with today’s fiscal constraints, stopping short of giving in to the isolationist forces within parliaments. It is hardly a sign of despair for the Alliance, although the lack of European capabilities identified should not be met with complacency.

Concrete Summit Deliverables

A strategy review in Chicago could offer three types of deliverables. First, there is the NATO circle for discussion among the 28 NATO member states. One of the lessons learned by Allies from the Balkan operations is that without the deployment of ground troops, it is difficult to win from the air. We will have to see whether there will be a need for ground troops to assist in the monitoring and transition phase following air operations, and which organization will have to take the lead (if any) given that no Ally seems inclined to deploy ground troops. There may be no request from the Libyan operation for any assistance in this regard, but the capability should exist.

Operation Unified Protector may be a turning point for NATO recognizing the flexibility to conduct different types of operations—from the demanding in Afghanistan to the shorter UN-mandated “bridging missions,” which are less demanding in human and financial terms. NATO is the only organization with the flexibility to operate at both ends of the spectrum, and this flexibility has proven critical in the face of uncertainties in contemporary operations. Moreover, smaller scale missions may be more likely because of budgetary constraints. These bridging missions could also make best use of NATO’s decision at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to improve the ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction effects by agreeing to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with others and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management (6).  These missions, aimed at roughly a 6-month period toward stabilization, would pave the way for another organization to take the lead in reconstruction efforts, while buying time for the international community to assist “home grown” political settlements necessary for stabilization prior to reconstruction (7).  In any case, this type of operation should foster cooperation with other international organizations and refrain from any competing calls between organizations.

Allies will be called upon in Chicago to consider their core capabilities for future operations on the basis of the guidance provided by the 2010 Strategic Concept, while taking full account of today’s fiscal constraint. It may prove useful to consider reviewing the case of Libya and draw some key conclusions when it comes to defining NATO’s core capabilities for limited operations (8).  This should not detract from the major allied focus and U.S.-led effort in operations, such as the International Security Assistance Force. Afghanistan will undoubtedly remain the central theme of the Chicago Summit.

Second, the Libyan crisis can offer some lessons in terms of NATO partnerships. Inviting partners to a NATO strategy review of Operation Unified Protector in Chicago would recognize the contribution of NATO partnerships both militarily and politically in terms of the support provided by partners both in the region, such as Qatar, and beyond, such as Sweden. This would militate in favor of a “big tent meeting” at the Chicago Summit where the Libyan operation, and possibly the post-operation strategy, could be reviewed. While the tendency at NATO would likely be to organize a meeting with troop contributing nations, it may be that Allies would gain from reaching out more broadly to countries in the region in order to develop a balanced political dialogue (9).

A partnership meeting on the post Libyan operation, open to other international organizations, might also give focus to ongoing discussions regarding whether and how NATO could assist countries south of the Mediterranean in developing the necessary security reforms in the face of popular uprisings experienced in the wake of the Arab Spring. Partnering with the EU in this context may offer some valuable prospects for enhancing NATO–EU cooperation (10).  Cooperation with other regional organizations, such as the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, and African Union, also hold significant potential in developing capacities in the region.

Finally, the interest of emerging powers in the Middle East and North Africa was demonstrated in the various diplomatic efforts toward a negotiated settlement in Libya on the part of Russia, South Africa, and others, and should be recognized by NATO. Moreover, dialoguing with countries that hold a seat on the UN Security Council and that supported UNSCR 1973 is a long-term requirement for UN-mandated NATO bridging missions. This could also be handled as a side event as a summit conference. A strategy review on the Libyan crisis would be an opportunity to engage a broad political dialogue beyond NATO partnerships, reaching out to significant security interlocutors at a time when U.S. public and Congress seem to focus increasingly beyond Europe. There will likely be a growing interest internationally in ensuring security and stability prior to investing in the resumption of oil production in Libya. Chicago could be an opportunity to look beyond together while ensuring that the transatlantic partnership continues to deliver its unique and flexible capabilities in terms of command and control of complex operations when the security environment calls for action.

Dr. Isabelle Francois is a Distinguished Senior Visiting Research Fellow with the Center for Transatlantic Studies, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

WORKS CITED:

[1] See “Split in NATO over Libya mission,” March 22, 2011, available at <http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/22-Mar-2011/Split-in-Nato-over-Libya-mission>; David Brunnstrom, “NATO still split on taking over Libya operation,” Reuters, March 23, 2011, available at <http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE72M4T720110323?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews; Steven Lee Myers and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Allies are split on goal and exit strategy in Libya,” The New York Times, March 25, 2011, available at <www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/africa/25policy.html?_r=1&scp=12&sq=25%20march%202011&st=cse>.

[2] On June 8, 2011, NATO Defense Ministers “extended Operation Unified Protector for a further 90 days from 27 June.” See NATO, “Statement on Libya,” June 8, 2011, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_75177.htm>.

[3] Robert M. Gates, “The Future of NATO,” June 10, 2010, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581>.

[4] For example, fighter bombers, warships, surveillance, aircraft refueling, and drones. See Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO after Libya”, June 29, 2011, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75836.htm>.

[5] Tomas Valasek, “What Libya says about the future of the transatlantic alliance,” Essays (London: Centre for European Reform, July 2011), available at <www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_libya_july11.pdf>.

[6] At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, building on earlier efforts, NATO heads of state and government in their Declaration (para. 2) “decided to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management, as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to deliver stabilization and reconstruction effects.” To that end, they “agreed to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management.” See para. 9 in NATO, “Lisbon Summit Declaration,” November 20, 2010, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_tests_688828.htm?mode=pressrelease>.

[7] Some analysts have made a strong case for the European Union to take over from NATO in Libya. See John E. Herbst and Leo G. Michel, “Why the EU should patrol Libya,” European Voice, July 14, 2011, 9.

[8] For expediency, the NATO summit will focus on Afghanistan because it remains the most demanding allied operation. Also, there is an important public message to deliver in the context of transition. In addition, it would be difficult to gage and prepare for a summit meeting on Libya without any certainty regarding what NATO’s role will be. However, smaller operations are central to Alliance efforts and transformation, and the political message of an operation with Europeans in the lead is one that demands attention.

[9] The summit focus on Afghanistan could provide an opportunity for partners to attend based on their status as troop contributing nations to the International Security Assistance Force. It would be useful, however, to reach out beyond troop contributors to an operation. Allies and partners should consider future commitments for smaller operations such as Unified Protector, and should reach out more broadly to discuss the value-added internationally of United Nations–mandated bridging missions.

[10] See Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and the Mediterranean: the changes ahead,” June 16, 2011, available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75547.htm>.

The deficit reduction deal signed by President Obama on August 2, 2011, calls for a quantum leap forward in the effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of the U.S. National Security System – by November 2011.  In the same way that the Hart-Rudman Report was sitting on a shelf in the Eisenhower Building ready for rapid deployment after September 11, 2001, the Project on National Security Reform’s 2008 Report “Forging a New Shield” is now sitting on a shelf in the Eisenhower Building ready for rapid deployment in the next three months.  Fortunately – as Darren Ruch’s essay below demonstrates – the main message of the report has moved into the intellectual capillaries of the U.S. National Security System in the last three years:  our expensive, outdated bureaucratic stovepipes should be replaced with less expensive, more agile interagency national security teams.  Ruch explains the need to shift away from a 20th Century “national defense” mindset dominated by a “joint” Department of Defense stovepipe toward a 21st Century “national security” mindset facilitated by much less expensive national security interagency teams.  Ruch is especially convincing about the need for interagency training to help create these interagency teams.  (Dr. J. Douglas Orton, Adjunct Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research.)   

Thousands of pages of lessons learned about successful methods of interagency collaboration are available in reports by the various US Government departments, academic and research institutions (such as the National Defense University and the US Institute of Peace), non-governmental organizations (such as Doctors without Borders and Human Rights Watch), and other agencies – compiled from years of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.  But US agencies in Afghanistan today are not taking advantage of this knowledge.  Instead, our military officers and civil servants are spending their first months in the field learning lessons that were already documented and available to them.  Prior to leaving for Afghanistan, US agencies should include these lessons learned about unity of effort in joint training settings.

Over the last week of July 2011, up to 95 US Air Force combat flights flew daily in support of Coalition troops in Afghanistan.  These sorties were only successful because of cooperation between the Air Force and other military branches before the fighter squadrons deployed to Afghanistan.  This unity of effort can only exist when multiple branches participate in joint training.  Pilots invest countless hours of joint training in the US with their Army counterparts to ensure safe and successful integration of air and ground tactics.  Training in the US before arriving in Afghanistan allows these Airmen and Soldiers to prepare for unexpected scenarios, seamlessly adapt their plans at a moment’s notice, and therefore successfully achieve their goal.

Given that the US military has demonstrated over the past 30 years that the effectiveness of unity of effort is proportional to the quality of joint training, the Obama Administration should heed this lesson.  There must be an increase in joint training operations across government agencies before they send teams to Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency experts continue to advocate an increase in unity of effort in Afghanistan.  The first of many recommendations in the 2009 US White Paper Policy towards Afghanistan is “executing and resourcing an integrated civilian military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan” (emphasis added).  Integrating civilian and military counterinsurgency efforts is necessary because success is only achieved through a multidimensional strategy.

Fighting an insurgency is accomplished by completing three principal concepts: clear, hold, build.  General Petraeus, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, outlines these principles in his 2006 counterinsurgency field manual: “create a secure physical and psychological environment; establish firm government control of the populace and area; gain the populace’s support.”  The military is not manned or trained to complete all three alone.

Creating a stable Afghanistan requires not only providing security, but also building effective local government and developing the economy.  The central mission of the Department of Defense is providing and maintaining security.  Other agencies, such as the Departments of State and Commerce, focus on building Afghanistan’s governmental institutions and developing the economic infrastructure.  Leaders at all levels from these US government agencies need to work together in the US to increase their communication and situational awareness before continuing operations and programs in Afghanistan.  By improving their common operational picture at home, agencies will understand idiosyncratic terminology; prevent a duplication of effort; establish communication channels to better share information on changing environments; reduce unwanted interference; and benefit from other agencies’ comparative advantages.

General Petraeus is one leader who understands this requirement for interagency dialogue. While serving as Multi-National Forces Commander in Iraq, he developed a close working relationship with Ambassador Crocker, US Ambassador to Iraq.  Common communication between top military and Department of State leaders in this way is unusual.  General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker worked together almost as a unified command, complementing each other’s efforts.  Ultimately, this turned the tide from a failing attempt in Iraq to allow a drawdown of US troops.

For a vastly different and more complicated theater of operations in Afghanistan, much more interagency dialogue needs to occur at home.  This dialogue must start in an interagency training environment in the US.  Although interagency training exists, it is not a priority.  As one Foreign Service Officer explained, although he was assigned to attend a week of interagency training before leaving for a one-year post in Iraq, his leadership viewed other tasks as a more valuable use of his time; he only attended for three days.  Training should be a much higher priority for these interagency teams.  Requiring soldiers and civil servants to get up to speed about other agencies in Afghanistan during the first few months after arriving, instead of providing interagency training in the US before they leave, does not set them up for success from day one.  Without this training, these actors arrive in Afghanistan without a common operational picture.

The Department of Defense should take the countless best practices from military joint operations and apply them to interagency efforts in Afghanistan.  Military commanders of all ranks should work with their civilian counterparts to establish a stable and transparent government, strong economy, and secure environment in Afghanistan.  Successful interagency collaboration begins with joint training in the US.  We are approaching the tenth anniversary of Coalition engagement in Afghanistan.  Reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan will continue well into the next decade regardless of the caliber of predeployment training; however, with the current US and Coalition military campaign, the quality of joint preparedness today could have an even greater impact on the reconstruction effort after the inevitable draw-down of combat forces.

Darren Ruch works at the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and is a reservist in the US Air Force.  As a homemade explosive specialist at JIEDDO, he primarily assists military units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a traditional reservist in the Massachusetts Air National Guard, Ruch is two-tour veteran and currently serves as a Lieutenant in their Air Operations Group.

Executive Summary: On July 26, 2011 the Center for Strategic Research, part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies, partnered with the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council to host a panel discussion entitled, “The India-Pakistan Security Dilemma: Major Issues and Charting a Viable Role for the United States.”  The event took place from 10:00-11:30 a.m. at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.  Moderated by INSS Distinguished Research Fellow, Dr. Thomas Lynch, the panel featured presentations by four young scholars of – and practitioners in –security matters affecting South Asia: Mr. Dhruva Jaishankar of the German Marshall Fund (GMF), Dr. Aparna Pande of the Hudson Institute, Mr. Moeed Yusuf from the U.S. Institute of Peace (USiP) and Dr. S. Amer Latif from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Each panelist made a short formal presentation diagnosing the major issues underpinning the decades-long Indo-Pakistan security dilemma. Panelists then offered recommendations on a viable policy role for U.S. in context of their identified issues.  Steered by the moderator, the four panelists exchanged views on several presentation elements.  The discussion concluded with seven questions from an audience of over 100 attendees.  A transcript of the entire event is available now at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center web site: http://www.acus.org/event/india-pakistan-security-dilemma-major-issues-and-charting-viable-role-united-states.  It will be available on a future date – yet to be determined – at the NDU-INSS site:  http://www.ndu.edu/inss/.

The panel discussion generated three major insights:

KEY OBSERVATIONS:

• India-Pakistan Security Dilemma Roots Run Deep, defying Near-Term Policy ‘fixes.’  The bitter legacy of ethno-religious mistrust and bloodshed between Indians and Pakistanis remains dominant – a fact often under-appreciated by outsiders. India’s approach toward South Asian security over the past 20 years may be trending toward restraint and moderation, but this is not the view in Islamabad.  Pakistan’s history with anti-Hindu militants and nuclear weapons still arrests New Delhi’s will to contemplate short-term security concessions much less acts of strategic altruism.
• U.S. Policy Options – especially in the Near-Term – are Limited by America’s Regional Reputation, Divergent Indian and Pakistani Expectations, and Constrained Leverage.  Many Indians mistrust the basic thrust of U.S. interaction with Islamabad and Rawalpindi, believing that it co-facilitates hostile Pakistani narratives and actions against India.  A majority of Pakistanis loathe American lecturing and ultimatums, convinced these arise – at least in part – from a decade-long tilt of American policy toward preference for India.  American aid to Pakistan generates useful bilateral dialogue and some policy concessions, but produces insufficient leverage to induce any near-term adjustment of Islamabad’s security paradigm or dominant anti-Indian narrative.  Growing American economic interaction with New Delhi has merit on its own terms, but does not produce sufficient leverage for Washington to push for India’s alteration of its firm and longstanding security approach toward Pakistan in critical areas like the Kashmir dispute, Islamic militants and nuclear weapons.
• Viable U.S. Policy Options Appear Limited to Mid-to-Long Term Efforts that Underwrite Greater Bilateral Dialogue and Compromise on Non-Core Security Issues. A viable American policy approach will be crafted once Washington accepts that its main options are those with mid-to-long run time horizons and largely limited to activities that build habits of cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad in non-core security issues. A U.S.-brokered dialogue between Pakistan and India about what each desires as an end-state in Afghanistan – and where accommodation between them might be reached in the areas of military-to-military and economic ‘rules of the road’ for a post-2014 Afghanistan – stands-out as one of the more viable areas for U.S. policy attention. To be successful, such an effort will take time and serious diplomatic focus.  The United States also might quietly encourage sustained interaction and tangible progress in confidence-building activities – especially those in the trade and military dimensions – from the recently resumed India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue. Finally, Washington might push for three-way participation in simple military-to-military maritime and humanitarian exercises. In turn, this initiative should encourage a U.S. review of its presently fragmented bureaucratic arrangements for policy-making in South Asia. These must be rationalized before Washington can develop a coherent and effective long-term U.S. policy approach towards Pakistan and India.

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Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III is the Distinguished Research Fellow for South Asia and the Near East at the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (NDU-INSS). Dr. Lynch wishes to thank Shuja Nawaz, Shikha Bhatnagar and the staff of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center for co-sponsoring this panel discussion. The views expressed are his alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Atlantic Council, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.  Dr. Lynch may be contacted at (202) 685-2231 or thomas.lynch@ndu.edu.

Executive Summary:  On June 17, 2011, The INSS Center for Strategic Research conducted a seminar on Iraq’s re-emergent energy sector and its impact on national and regional politics. The purpose was to move beyond identity politics by examining resource-based interests and new tensions and opportunities for negotiation between groups in and across Iraq’s borders. Discussions focused on Iraq’s national energy strategy as influenced by regional trends and the impact of petroleum sector development on relations between Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and provincial administrations. To what extent have these developments affected governance in Iraq? What implications do they have for U.S. policy, particularly as the U.S. military withdraws combat troops from the country?

Experts on Iraq and the energy sector addressed these issues in two panel discussions. They stressed the importance that oil will play in Iraq but were pessimistic about Iraq’s projections of future oil production. The speakers concluded that “Iraq will not be the next Saudi Arabia anytime soon.” Alongside infrastructure constraints, unresolved political issues between groups will continue to shape prospects for the energy sector. The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces scheduled for the end of this year also is expected to negatively affect Iraqi oil production due to reduced security.

The global and regional energy context. Trends in the global energy sector underline the significance and vulnerabilities of Iraq as an oil-producing state. Over the next 25 years global energy demand is expected to rise considerably; by 2030 the world will need about 103 million barrels of oil a day. This increase is anticipated to come mainly from non-OECD countries in East Asia and the Middle East.

Growing demand will provide incentives for producers to increase supply, either by using their excess reserves or increasing production. Specifically, it may require that Saudi Arabia produce 5 million additional barrels per day (bpd) and that Iraq increase its production as well. Based on these projected trends, OPEC’s market share can increase from 41 percent today to 52 percent by 2035.

What are the prospects for Iraq’s oil sector? Iraq can play an important role in increasing world energy supplies, although the extent to which it can attain predicted output levels is highly questionable. Despite world demand and the potential of Iraqi oil production, the effects of the bid rounds and foreign investment are unlikely to be realized until the end of the decade. Iraqi oil production is likely to remain at current levels (2.25 million bpd) through at least until 2012. Although official projections call for major increases in production, according to one energy expert, if Iraq produces four million bpd of oil by 2020 it would be a “tremendous success.”

Challenges and constraints to Iraqi oil production include:

• Political, administrative and technical bottlenecks.Conflicting incentives and expectations between international oil companies (IOCs) and the Iraqi government are likely to complicate oil production. While IOCs seek immediate production and profit, the central government aims to assure control of oil sector activities, which has resulted in lower profit margins. Iraq’s technical service contracts (TSCs), for instance, have low production minimums and per barrel prices. The Iraqi petroleum sector also remains nationalized and is highly inefficient.Additionally, oil company deployment, security, visas, and Iraqi budget approvals are painstakingly slow and require massive levels of oversight and bureaucracy. Accountability, internal auditing, inventory control, and management of revenues are other major concerns. Conflicts on spending exist between the Iraqi oil and finance ministries, as well as between the central government and local populations. Iraq’s massive limitations on water, power, and export infrastructure pose further difficulties for companies investing in Iraqi oil.

• Unclear legal environment. Absence of a national hydrocarbons law and inconsistencies in existing laws, a zero-sum and risk-averse business mentality, and inexperience with western contracts create additional obstacles for IOCs. Contractors now want to be paid in kind, which may lead to shrinkage in the oil sector. Moreover, since the Arab Spring, Iraqi citizens are demanding more from Baghdad in terms of equitable and effective provision of goods and services. It will be more difficult for the central government in Baghdad to invest in energy projects that do not yield immediate improvements in the welfare of the citizenry.The central government and KRG will continue to sign contracts with IOCs in the hopes of pressing forward and increasing oil production and revenues. According to one panelist, “Iraq is on its way to becoming a Nigeria on steroids.” Yet there is a growing realization in Baghdad that production levels are unlikely to be met and that service agreements may have to be renegotiated. Such changes will lead to additional costs and frustrations for future investment in the oil sector.

• Are alternative export options available?Given Iraq’s ambitious oil production plans, the large percentage that petroleum comprises of state income (90 percent) and undeveloped pipeline infrastructure, Baghdad is seeking ways to increase export capacity through its southern and northern routes. Over the past year, the central government has signed contracts with international companies to repair and upgrade its current export infrastructure, renewed pipeline agreements with Turkey, and pursued additional routes.Still, the possibility of Iraq turning to or establishing alternative export routes at this time is unlikely. Developing pipelines through Syria, despite recently signed Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) between Baghdad and Damascus in September 2010, is unrealistic given Syria’s unstable political conditions. Jordan remains an export point as demand and production increases. An export route through Saudi Arabia would require an unprecedented rapprochement with Riyadh, which does not seem likely in the near future. Additionally, the Saudi pipeline has been changed to a gas line and would need to be restructured for oil if it were to be used to export Iraqi petroleum.

An alternative route from the Kurdistan Region northward could be the most pragmatic option as it would provide more reliable access of Iraqi oil to European markets. Yet the Kirkuk-Ceyhan line is still under-utilized and Baghdad has commitments to developing its southern ports. The KRG could not unilaterally pursue such a project since it does not have the legal right to build a transnational pipeline to Turkey without Baghdad’s approval. Despite increased investment in the Kurdistan region and recognition of the KRG in a federal Iraq, the central government and regional states remain concerned about an overly autonomous Kurdish north and cross-border Kurdish nationalist influences.

Iran has little interest in a strong Iraqi oil economy that would enhance Iraqi independence and challenge its own petroleum sector. Iran may have a different set of goals, which include gaining a greater influence in the Iraqi energy market and constructing trans-Iraqi pipelines. Most participants agreed, however, that while Iran is uneasy with the idea that Iraq may be on par with Saudi Arabia in regard to OPEC quotas, Iraqis are uncomfortable with Iran’s blatant attempts to gain control of its petroleum, such as seizing an Iraqi oil well briefly last year. Iran could respond by creating trouble for Iraq through a whole host of measures, including targeting IOCs in the south.

Nor is Kuwait likely to play a constructive role in Iraq’s oil development. On the contrary, progress on rebuilding relations has been limited since the fall of Saddam Husayn’s regime. Baghdad certainly needs Kuwaiti support to remove sanctions still in force since 1990. It also wants debt forgiveness from Kuwait and greater access to the Gulf. Yet Baghdad rejects the land and maritime borders imposed by the U.N. Basra has already indicated that the demarcation is being changed on the Kuwait border. Iraq also is displeased that Kuwait funded a Syrian irrigation project that diverted water from the Tigris River. Tensions have also reemerged over Kuwait’s building of the Mubarak port, which will rival Iraq’s efforts to enlarge its meager facilities and increase export capacity.

How has energy development influenced and been influenced by national and regional politics? Given the centrality of oil to politics in Iraq, energy development has played a key role in shaping the political landscape. Yet there also are limitations to oil’s role in resolving the country’s problems. Underlying the future of energy development are issues of national reconciliation and state structure, or where power resides in Iraq.

Specifically, while the Kurdish parties heavily favor a confederal structure where they have larger revenue distribution and control of local resources, other Arab parties are mixed regarding the issue of state structure. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Dawa party and the Sadrists favor a centralized state and Baghdad’s direct control over the oil sector. Some Arab Sunni groups, however now support confederalism as a means of increasing their influence in a federal Iraqi state.

Most Iraqis, regardless of ethnic or religious identity, want some benefit from oil or gas production in their province or region. If the KRG gets greater local control over its oil sector, southern Iraqi provinces are likely to make similar claims. For instance, Anbar is pressing to develop the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) fields in its province and gain greater control over the local security situation.

• Energy intensifies existing debates over Kurdish autonomy. For the KRG, control of oil would facilitate demands for economic independence and allow it to ignore Baghdad. The KRG not only wants to control its own oil, but also seeks to delineate borders and resolve issues of disputed territories, particularly Kirkuk. The KRG thinks that a confederal structure would check the power of the central government and give it sufficient leverage to negotiate political issues. The KRG also views confederalism as the best guarantee for its own security, at least in checking Baghdad’s potential control over regional affairs.

• Energy creates new resource-based tensions. The unclear and competing visions of the nature of the Iraqi state – whether power should be centralized or decentralized – and the drive to increase oil revenues have influenced Baghdad’s relations with provincial administrations and the KRG. One of the tensions is over management and control of the oil sector and its revenues, enhanced by deliberately written ambiguities of the 2005 Constitution. Article 112 discusses the intent of the central government to work with regional and provincial governments. Yet it also has been used by local administrations to assert their authority over oil fields in their provinces. The Wasit provincial council, for example, attempted to shut down an oil field operation in its territory in September 2010, claiming that article 112 gave it the right to do so.Iraqi populations also are claiming a greater share of oil revenues, which has led to new resentments over perceived inequalities among provinces. Although Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution created mechanisms to give oil-producing provinces one dollar for every barrel produced, this revenue has not been distributed equally across Iraq. Basra has benefited because it has the most petroleum production, as well the fact that it is closely intertwined with Baghdad and the regime. Oil-poor provinces such as Anbar, however, have been ignored in the new Iraqi state and in its distribution of petroleum rents.In some cases in southern and central Iraq, these tensions have escalated to attacks on local leaders. As a result, governorate-level security forces are assuming greater control of well site security, which is intensifying the conflict. Al-Maliki has responded by assigning the Iraqi army to guard the oil pipelines, although this effort is unlikely to be accepted by provincial leaders who rely on their own local security forces and are pressing for regional-based security. Additionally, many of the IOCs do not trust Iraqi security forces and may take increasing responsibility for their own security by building airstrips to internalize personnel movements and using private security forces.

  While most provinces want some benefit of energy sector revenues, the KRG has been the most aggressive in demanding complete control over oil and gas production in the Kurdistan Region. Arbil has taken advantage of Baghdad’s intransience and resisted integration into an overall national structure. Since 2002 the KRG has signed 37 production sharing contracts (PSCs) and has earned over one billion dollars in signing bonuses alone. Additionally, the KRG has placed oil companies beyond the Kurdish-Arab border in the disputed territory of Kirkuk. This strategy has created new “facts on the ground” to entrench its political and economic interests.

• Energy encourages deal-making. Weakness in the federalist structure alongside energy sector demands have encouraged deal-making between the various factions in the Iraq government. Given the budgetary problems faced by Baghdad and Arbil (Baghdad has a deficit and the KRG has not paid the IOCs), a compromise over oil payments may be possible in the near future. For instance, the Kurds and the opposition Iraqiyya Party of Ayad Allawi appear to be combining efforts on oil and gas issues by claiming the bid rounds are unconstitutional. The Kurdistan Alliance also gave the oil and gas committee chairmanship to Adnan Janabi, an Iraqiya member, who has introduced a law separating oil operating companies from the Ministry of Oil. Other pressures for a compromise could be linked to Turkish policy shifts, the KRG’s need to pay IOCs in its region, and increasing demands from some provinces in southern and central Iraq about greater decentralization.Still, Baghdad-KRG negotiations are slow and uncertain. The central government has partially paid the costs of only two oil companies in the Kurdistan Region thus far, but not their profits. The payment was not part of an officially approved or audited scheme, but rather, a secret agreement and political bargain between al-Maliki and KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih. Compromise can be further deterred by revenue growth, frustration from Baghdad with Kurdish maximalist policy, territorial disputes, and U.S. policy appearing to favor the KRG.

What are the outstanding issues in negotiating a national hydrocarbons law? The debate over control of natural resources and revenue-sharing has had important implications for Baghdad-KRG relations. While the KRG wants petroleum to be managed and negotiated locally with limited revenues transferred to the central government, Baghdad seeks greater control of the energy sector and distribution of its finances. Similarly, the KRG has emphasized that it wants to limit the central government’s role in revenue-sharing. These differences have played out in the failure to ratify a national hydrocarbons law and revenue-sharing law.

• Legitimacy and Nature of Production Sharing. One of the key issues between the KRG and Baghdad is the legitimacy of the PSCs signed by the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources. Recognition of the Kurdish contracts will partially depend upon which faction wins out in the central government. The “common sense” faction, led by Adnan Janabi, could allow for negotiation and recognition of the PSCs. Janabi believes that making a deal with the Kurds will help put him in a position of power and assist Ayad Allawi in becoming Prime Minister. Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs, Hussein al-Shahristani and al-Maliki represent the “non-common sense” faction that is trying to preserve centralization. They pose the strongest challenge to the KRG and recognition of the PSCs in their current form.Even if the Janabi faction prevails, Kurdish contracts and payment mechanisms would be subject to a large host of processes, accounting procedures, and audits by different Iraqi ministries and agencies. Baghdad also could recognize the PSCs but structure them like the TSCs used in southern and central Iraq. Negotiation also depends upon the KRG, which has been unwilling to open its oil and financial records to Baghdad or use its own revenues to pay IOC profits.

Whether or not a national hydrocarbons law is essential to Iraqi petroleum production is questionable. While it would allow large companies to expand beyond their current boundaries by clarifying complex responsibility and timing issues, an oil law ultimately is not necessary to resolve the larger Baghdad-KRG dispute about the structure and nature of power in the Iraqi state.

What effect will U.S. military withdrawal in Iraq have on the country’s oil production? The U.S. withdrawal is expected to have a negative impact on Iraqi oil sector development by contributing to delays in production and exportation and removing an important source of logistics, intelligence, and security for the Iraqi government and IOCs.

The absence of the U.S. military also will increase the transaction costs of doing business in Iraq. Increased security risks could diminish interest in the next bidding round since fields are smaller and in riskier areas. It may also give greater access to Chinese and Korean national oil companies, which have invested in Iraq’s oil sector and are generally interested in new wells, alongside increased economic and technical cooperation. The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) currently is developing the Halfaya oil field and has partnered with British Petroleum (BP) to develop the super-giant Rumaila oil field. The Chinese National Offshore Corporation (CNOOC) is leading the development of the 2.5 billion barrel Missan oil field in southern Iraq.

Still, participants agreed that the U.S. could play an important indirect role in influencing Iraqi energy production in the following ways:

• Building-up staff capabilities.According to one energy expert and former U.S. diplomat, the U.S. could build up staff capability in the Iraq oil ministry and national oil company. These efforts could include developing collaboration between actors, streamlining procurement in large bureaucracies and energy systems, and encouraging Iraqis, who tend to feel they were once good technocrats and do not need help to become successful, to update their skills and knowledge of the energy sector. Increasing diplomatic focus on keeping the country stable will also help move it forward.The most successful model for Iraq could be one in which the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund provide assistance to the ministries. This third party model would provide the unique expertise that is needed without direct American involvement.

• Revisit U.S.-KRG relations. A U.S.-KRG alliance was vital to realize immediate political objectives after the 2003 war and is important to assuring regional stability. Yet now that these objectives have been realized, at least in part, some thought the United States may need to revisit its approach and policy toward the KRG. Washington should send a message to the KRG that it will continue to protect the Kurds, although not unconditionally in light of growing KRG authoritarianism and disinterest in opening financial records to Baghdad. The United States should also stop acting as a safety net for the Kurds, which is breeding resentment among Arab Iraqis and could impede future negotiations between Baghdad and Arbil.

Known unknowns. There are several unknowns in Iraq’s energy future that the U.S. needs to consider, including the Sunni Arab response to the U.S. departure and stability of the country. Shi’a areas have had fourth-round oil development contracts; however, all gas development remains in Sunni Arab and mixed areas. It is uncertain how this aspect of energy development will unfold.

The Sadr movement’s response to the withdrawal or ongoing presence of U.S. troops could also jeopardize oil production and force new political alliances that are less welcoming to IOCs and the privatization of the oil sector. The nature of these alliances is uncertain, and one that can reformulate the energy sector potential. A final uncertainty is the future of democracy in Iraq as its leaders pursue rapid oil development. Will the federal system in its current form be sustained and if not, what type of state and political system will emerge? How would political changes affect economic development and wealth distribution? Who will benefit?

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Dr. Denise Natali is the Minerva Chair at the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. She may be contacted at (202) 685-2249 or denise.natali@ndu.edu. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.