Monthly Archives: March 2012
By Tess deBlanc-Knowles, Research Intern
Edited by Colonel Joel Rayburn, Military Research Fellow
Whether or not the Assad government survives the deepening current crisis, the explosion of violence and instability in Syria will have a serious impact on its neighbors and fundamentally alter regional dynamics. As the world considers the potential regional fallout, international attention has tended to focus either on Iran or on the exacerbation of sectarian divisions in Iraq. But civil war in Syria will also likely drag Lebanon into the fray and put devastating pressure on its fragile political framework.
In the face of Syrian unrest, the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Mikati has attempted to pursue a policy of determined neutrality in an effort to “disassociate” itself from the Syrian conflict. The government has attempted to insulate Lebanon from Syria’s instability by steering clear of both Arab League and international initiatives, declining to participate in sanctions against its neighbor or to play a role in the Arab League observer mission. Most recently, the government declined the invitation to attend the “Friends of Syria” conference in Tunisia, citing “compliance with the country’s disassociation policy.”
Beyond official statements, however, actors within Lebanon have begun jockeying to capitalize on Syria’s political disruption and the perceived waning of the Assad government’s power. Hezbollah’s March 8 coalition, for example, has clearly affirmed its support of the Assad government. In recent speeches, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrullah downplayed the scale of the Syrian unrest, blaming the media for false reports and exaggerated casualty counts. Nasrullah additionally cautioned that a new regime in Syria would increase the influence of both the United States and Israel.
By contrast, leaders of the opposition March 14 coalition have declared support for “the will of Syrian the people” and the establishment of democracy in Syria. Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri has called for “solidarity with the Syrian people” and for international recognition of the opposition Syrian National Council. In a recent interview, Fares Soueid, the Secretary General of March 14, affirmed the coalition’s support of the SNC and boldly asserted, “the Syrian regime will most certainly fall down.”
This polarization over Syria has touched even those who ostensibly occupy the neutral center of Lebanon’s political spectrum. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has participated publicly in anti-Assad rallies and has predicted that “the Syrian people’s revolution will win,” and has gone so far as to call for arming the Syrian opposition. President Michel Suleiman, similarly, appeared to side with the Syrian opposition when he declared in late February that “we, as friends of the Syrian people, hope that democracy will be established in Syria because if it is well, then Lebanon will be well.”
Meanwhile, Lebanon’s domestic politics have ground to a halt. Public fracturing of cabinet politicians along pro and anti-Syrian lines continues to raise tensions within government, stymieing compromise and hampering basic functioning. Disagreements between pro-Assad Christian leader Michel Aoun and the anti-Assad opposition led to a four week suspension of cabinet sessions by Prime Minister Mikati last month. While Mikati declared the crisis resolved following the resignation of a cabinet member from Aoun’s political bloc, the stalemate illustrated the now-continuous tensions between the coalitions, which have flared again over budgetary issues.
Beyond politics, the spillover of Syria’s turmoil has led to unrest in the Lebanese street. Large anti-Assad rallies have been held in the cities of Saida and Wali Khalid, and the Russian embassy in Beirut was the scene of impassioned rival demonstrations following Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council Resolution proposing a gradual turnover of power by Assad. Most recently, tensions exploded in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli – always a sectarian flashpoint – where clashes between pro-Assad Alawites and anti-Assad Sunnis left 3 dead and 23 wounded. Pro and anti-Assad rallies escalated into violent clashes, including the launching of rocket-propelled grenades from both sides. Reports of armed militias roaming the streets, explosions of machine gun fire, and targeted attacks on Lebanese Army personnel have flooded the Lebanese press. Weekly anti-Assad protests organized by the Salafi Hizb Ut-Tahrir have followed the violence in the city, with protestors calling for jihad against the Assad government.
The government responded to these incidents by dispatching the army to reestablish security. The Lebanese Armed Forces have additionally been deployed, since the first week in February, along the northern border with Syria. This deployment came at the request of the Syrian regime in response to growing Free Syrian Army activity in the area and the vocal condemnation by the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon of the smuggling of weapons across the border into Syria from its “brotherly state.” Such a deployment, ostensibly to maintain “security,” undermines Mikati’s neutrality policy and brings Lebanon a step closer to outright involvement in the conflict. While Mikati has emphasized the deployment as an effort to protect the country’s borders, Hezbollah has indicated the importance of the army’s border presence as an impediment to the actions of Syrian sympathizers and to intercept the flow of weapons to the Syrian opposition. Large numbers of refugees fleeing the violence, estimated by the UNHCR to number over 6000, further add to the complex situation in the north.
Publicly, Hezbollah’s leaders have proclaimed their neutrality, asserting their commitment to maintaining Lebanon’s distance from the Syrian troubles. For example, Deputy Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem declared that Hezbollah “will not allow Lebanon to be used as a platform to attack others or a conduit for settling political scores in order to execute Israeli and American projects.” By framing the statement in such a manner, Qassem attempted to position the organization with the disassociation stance of the government, albeit with a firm anti-western intervention message. Meanwhile, in response to Prime Minister Mikati’s earlier suspension of the cabinet, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah publicly confirmed the organization’s support of the government, insisting that now “is not the appropriate time for overthrowing cabinets in Lebanon.” Nasrallah has voiced the opinion that Lebanon would be the first country affected by Syrian unrest, and has thus asserted Hezbollah’s commitment to the current Lebanese government and its attempts to provide stability and political security.
Reports from the ground, however, paint a different picture. A number of sources have implicated Hezbollah in pro-Syrian activities in the border areas, including the tracking down of opposition leaders, the training of snipers, and the involvement of Iranian intelligence officers. More recently. The Free Syrian Army condemned the alleged involvement of Hezbollah armed brigades, along with Iranian Revolutionary Guards, in supporting the Syrian regime.
In its public rhetoric, Hezbollah has endeavored to transfer blame for Lebanese instability to the actions of March 14, while simultaneously shifting the focus to the threat of Israel and Hezbollah’s critical role as a bulwark against it. Hezbollah has positioned itself as pro-Assad, but also pro-disassociation, launching rhetorical attacks at its March 14 rivals, accusing them of arming the Syrian opposition and of attempting to use the Syrian uprising as an avenue for political gain. Senior Hezbollah official, Nabil Qaouk, warned March 14 against such steps, asserting that “the resistance today is at its strongest and is prepared to bring down a great catastrophe upon Israel.” Following the anti-Assad speeches of March 14 leaders Saad Hariri and Amin Gemayal, Nasrallah asserted the opposition alliance was “plunging Lebanon into war.”
In fairness, the fact that Hezbollah itself is guilty of what it accuses March 14 of doing does not mean that March 14 is entirely innocent. There is ample evidence that some March 14 elements do, at a minimum, have the intent of helping to arm the Syrian opposition, as Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea recently implied in his call to all countries to act decisively to stop the murder of Syrian civilians. And a recent explosion at an arms warehouse in Tripoli may have involved a Future Movement cache intended for arming the Syrian opposition.
Thus the stage is set for Syria’s violence to spill over into Lebanon. Lebanese politics have become deeply polarized, rival Lebanese factions are likely providing material support to the opposing Syrian sides, and the tension is already causing armed clashes within Lebanese borders. Of course, the collapse of the Assad government would bring with it the danger of a security vacuum in any case. Such a dynamic would have the strong likelihood of pushing Syria over the precipice into full-blown civil war, an occurrence that would send shockwaves through the delicate sectarian and security stability of the region as a whole. Civil war in Syria would almost certainly complete the unraveling of Lebanon’s shaky confessional political system and plunge it back into civil war, and thus, as the crisis in Syria worsens, the issue of the Assad government’s survival will eventually imperil the survival of the Lebanese government as well. For Lebanon, to not follow a policy of disassociation would indeed be, as Prime Minister Mikati has declared, “suicidal.” But the influx of Syrian refugees, the escalation of political struggles, the polarization of the political parties, and the eruption of popular violence seem to indicate that this is a policy that has already failed.
 “Mikati , in Paris, Says France Understands Lebanon’s Syria Sensitivities.” Daily Star 10 Feb 2012
 “Lebanon to Miss ‘Friends of Syria Conference.” Daily Star 21 Feb 2012
 Nasrallah, Hassan. Sayyid Al-Shuhada Complex, Beirut, Lebanon. 7 Feb. 2012.
 “We are with the Syrian People as a whole and support the democratic option, and this is included in the proposal of the Syrian leadership” An Nahar 30 Jan 2012.
 “Lebanese Press Round-Up: February 15, 2012” NOW Lebanon 15 Feb 2012
 Interview with Fares Soueid. Al Arabiyya Television, Dubai 16 Feb 2012
 “Jumblatt Joins Anti-Syrian Regime Protest in Beirut” NOW Lebanon 22 Feb 2012
 “Jumblatt Calls for ‘Arming Syrian Opposition’” NOW Lebanon 25 Feb 2012
 “Suleiman: Some Flaws Need to Be Addressed to Fortify Taef Accord” Naharnet 24 Feb 2012.
 “Mikati, Suleiman Emerge Winners in Deal to End Cabinet Crisis” Daily Star 24 Feb 2012
 “Rival Demonstrators Face Off at Russian Embassy” Daily Star 6 Feb 2012
 “Syrian Violence Spills Over Into Lebanon.” Al Jazeera 12 Feb. 2012
 “Syrian Violence Spills Over Into Lebanon.” Al Jazeera 12 Feb. 2012.
 “The Syrian Uprising in the Eyes of Lebanese Islamists” Al Akhbar 29 Feb 2012 .
 “Mikati, Syria’s Envoy Discuss Arm’s Smuggling.” Daily Star 18 Jan 2012.
 Noor Malas and Charles Levinson, “Syrian Conflict Spills to Neighbors.” Wall Street Journal 18 Feb 2012.
 “Lebanon Won’t Be Used To Hit Arab States: Hezbollah.” Daliy Star 13 Feb. 2012.
 “Nasrallah: Time Not ‘Appropriate for Overthrowing Cabinets.’” NOW Lebanon 7 Feb. 2012.
 Mortada, Radwan. “Wadi Khalid: The Free Syrian Army Base in Lebanon” Al Akhbar 8 Feb 2012.
 Amar Al-Wawi. Interview by Hedi Aouidj. Owni. 20 Feb 2012. Web.
 “Snc Military Commander: Iranian, Hezbollah Brigades Fighting With Assad Forces” NOW Lebanon 1 March 2012
 “Hezbollah Warns March 14 not to wager on Political Change.” Daily Star 21 Feb 2012
 “Hezbollah Warns March 14 not to wager on Political Change.” Daily Star 21 Feb 2012
 “Future Block Says Nasrallah’s Speech Was ‘Negative.’” NOW Lebanon 21 Feb 2012.
 “Geagea: A Democratic Syria Ends ‘Exportation of Terrorism” NOW Lebanon 14 Feb 2012.
 “Tripoli Clashes and the Neo-Salafis” Al Akhbar 20 Feb 2012.
 Rizk, Sibylle. “Lebanon is Certainly Not an Organized Platform for Arms Exports to Syria.” Le Figaro 10 Feb 2012
By Michael Lynch, Research Intern, Center for Strategic Research
Edited by Dr. Denise Natali, CSR
Many would argue that the Arab Spring failed. This assumption of a squandered movement is largely based on differing perceptions of what the Arab Spring sought to bring about. If one were expecting liberal secular democracies emerging in the Middle-East, then disappointment is certain.
The reality is that the Arab Spring was never about democracy. It was about overthrowing the government that the general populous perceived as ailing them. Any confusion lies in the rhetoric of the leaders that emerged during the revolution and suggested that they were the champions of the movement. What seems to repeat itself is that in a power vacuum diaspora elites, who have been residing in the west until the uprisings, emerge from the political rubble and return home touting ambitions of western style democracy and governance. As the dust settles, the reality of the situation on the ground is much different than as advertised.
This emergence of diaspora leaders and their subsequent failures occur for several nearly universal reasons. The new leaders were educated in the west, speak very good English, and dress as proper western elites. The familiarity is comforting. These elites tell the US and its officials exactly what they want to hear. These propositions are the fantasies of a pro-west, democratic, and most importantly economically liberalized new state.
The problem; however, is that that these leaders may have the backing of western institutions but, they have little or no legitimacy on the ground. They did not fight alongside the revolutionaries, they did not endure the hardships under the former leader, and when they grew tired of their situation, they abandoned their homeland only to return at a rather opportunistic time.
The crisis of elite legitimacy was the case not just during the Arab Spring but also in the reconstruction of Iraq and most post-conflict state building operations. (see;Afghanistan). Maliki and Allawai fled Iraq only to return after the invasion and other prominent figures have tended to go to schools in Western Europe. They are the antithesis to Muqtada al-Sadr, a Islamist and arguably militant leader who is from Baghdad, fought against western forces, and oversees several massive social programs in the slums of Iraq, which are now known as Sadr city.
This scenario has repeated itself in the aftermath of Arab Spring where exiled, traditionally western educated men, have returned to oversee the new government. Specific examples include:
- Moncef Marzouki- Interim Tunisian President, fled to France in 2002. Studied medicine in Paris
- Moncef Marzouki- Egyptian Opposition Leader possible presidential candidate, returned from Vienna where he was director of IAEA, Doctorate in International Law New York University
- Abdurrahim al-Keib- Libyan Prime Minister, former engineering professor at University of Washington
- Burhan Ghalioun- President of Syrian National Counsel, professor University of Paris Sorbonne
These diaspora leaders will not become the power brokers in the country for several reasons. First, they are not able to distance themselves far enough from the former regime. While many had been long time activists, it appears longevity of polite resistance (op-eds in the New York Times) does not garner respect from the general populous in the Souks. Rather, what the movements that did manage to gain the most momentum appear to the embodiment of the opposite ideology of the former regime. In Tunisia and Egypt, formerly outlawed Islamist parties replaced secular, pro-western, modern, and highly militarized governments. In Libya, Ghadaffi’s rival tribal region Cyrenaica ousted him and the rest of his emplaced Tripolitania elites.
In each case, the opposition movement rallied around a direct opposing identity. Looking to throw off the shackles of the past and begin a new more prosperous era, they distanced themselves from the former system. This has happened in the Middle-East before, yet in the opposite direction. When Mustafa Kemal and the Young Turks ousted the Ottoman Empire, they wanted to establish a new governance that was as anti-Ottoman. Kemal replaced the Arabic script, moved the capitol from Istanbul and its Islamic architecture, and installed an entrenched secular ideology that still exists (however eroding) today.
The most prominent voice of the Syrian opposition movement is the Syrian National Counsel. The group was formed in Turkey, is composed of western elites, and was first conferred international legitimacy in Tunisia. The recognition of the SNC at the Friends of Syria Conference is problematic in itself. One would assume that the revolutionary factions would be too busy fighting in the streets of Damascus or under siege in Homs to take an international flight to attend a conference in at the La Palace hotel in Tunis.
The militant opposition, the Free Syrian Army, is also disadvantaged. First, it has no connection to the SNC, despite the SNC’s claims. The FSA is more of a network of lightly armed revolutionaries rather than an army as its name suggests. It has neither organizational hierarchy nor method of command and control. Unlike the armed opposition in Libya, the FSA lacks control over a geographic space and lacks a strategic stronghold like a Benghazi. Therefore when the question emerges about arming the opposition, it appears there is no consolidated military opposition to arm.
As the UN, United States, and other Western governments examine their options in Syria, there is a significant push to aid the Syrian opposition. The amount of fault lines the outcome of this conflict has is enormous. It is a situation that will not just affect the Syrian people but the entire region. It is worth noting that these perceived simple solutions such as “No-Kill Zones” or “Buffer Zones” or every ones favorite “Technical and Humanitarian Support” are never simple. These simple plans never seem to include a “what happens next” (see; Afghanistan) or contingency guidelines.
It should be worth noting that the staple of low level conflict, a truck mounted machine gun known as a “technical”, got its name from aid workers in Africa arming militants using “technical assistance” grants. Until there is a more unified and identifiable opposition as well as solidified power sharing agreements on what comes after Assad, the US needs to be cautious.
While the situation in Syria is grim, we need be weary that any misstep by the international community could escalate the situation to levels of violence far beyond what they are now. Any action in Syria risks crossing the Rubicon of Damascus.