Focus Recommendations for NATO’s Summit in Chicago

By Darren Ruch

As a general rule, wars are not fought unilaterally without the financial, political, and materiel assistance of other states.  Examples of historical, large-scale alliances include Allied (Entente) Powers and the Central Powers during World War I, the Allies versus the Axis during World War II, and the Cold War, involving a prolonged war between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members and the Warsaw Pact nations.  The commonality of alliances and multilateral action in conflicts remains today, such as in the Libya Civil War, in which the National Transitional Council, NATO, and other states formed an alliance to topple the Libyan regime.

Maintaining well-established alliances is a smart investment because of their many benefits and military effects.  Coming into its 63^rd anniversary, the NATO alliance has survived the end of the Cold War, the Balkan wars in the mid 1990s, and the Libya intervention in 2011.  As the 25^th summit in Chicago approaches, NATO will need to reaffirm its mission and prepare for another decade of following its charter and continuing the strongest and oldest alliance still in effect.  Furthermore, it is in every member’s interest, especially the U.S., that NATO not only remain intact, but continue to be a strong alliance for the future.  This paper will argue that NATO is far from retirement or in need for a major overhaul, but rather should continue promoting its values and demand an equal contribution from all its members.  The paper will briefly touch on NATO’s values and ideals, identify some shortcomings of the alliance with lessons learned from the Libya campaign, and conclude with some recommendations for the upcoming Chicago Summit.

On April 4, 1949, NATO was founded on the foundation of “democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”[1]  Within the first five articles of the treaty, the principles of joint negotiation, training, sovereignty, defense, and alliance are emphasized to promote defense stability and economic collaboration between its members.[2]  Successfully carrying out those ways and means is an important end for all the participating states: providing financial and materiel support to the military-strong states (US, UK, France, and Germany) and affording modernization and equipment to the members with smaller armed forces.[3]

NATO is an alliance for alliances; it rarely engages in operations solely with its own members.[4]  As of May 2012, NATO supports five operations: leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM), NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea (Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR), counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa (Operation OCEAN SHIELD), and supporting the African Union on the African continent, mostly focused in Somalia.[5]  Additionally, last year NATO completed its training mission in Iraq and, in October, concluded a successful four-month operation in Libya, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, which provided a no-fly zone over the country.  In all of those operations, past and current, NATO was just one alliance within a wider coalition force.

By continuously working in partnership with other nation states, NATO achieves a number of additional objectives and promotes core values aside from its military operations.  NATO requires its member states to maintain a democratic political system, operate a market economy, respect persons belonging to national minorities, resolve neighbor disputes, commit to peaceful dispute settlements, have the ability and willingness to make military contributions to alliances, and achieve interoperability with its member forces.[6]  All of these values are within the member states’ interest to promote, both within the alliance and abroad, because of the beneficial peaceful and economic partnerships they build.  For example, liberal peace theory hypothesizes that established democracies do not conduct war with one another.[7]  By requiring democratic governance to those wanting to join and maintain membership, NATO sends a clear message that its primary ways of conflict resolution is through peaceful means.  With regards to NATO’s desired economic ends, market economies tend to attract foreign investment and cause an increase in production and rapid development, which is likely to grow the global markets of those members with weaker economies.  Through its neighbor disputes clause, NATO ensures that its members maintain diplomatic channels of communication.  Therefore, there should always be a dialogue among the partnered nations regarding national security and strategic matters.  Maintaining open channels of communication is especially beneficial to those members who do not maintain strong diplomatic relations within the Organization, such as Turkey and Greece.

While NATO promotes peace and economic expansion, there are aspects that need to be strengthened.  After Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, a number of deficiencies were brought to light, despite NATO’s long history, lessons learned, and best practices.  In his departing speech from NATO as Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates concluded NATO’s “military capabilities simply aren’t there.”[8]  His reasons for such a failure included a lack of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; the inability of some nations to utilize their fighter aircraft effectively; insufficient targeting professionals; NATO’s failure to launch air sorties at over a 50% capacity; and a general shortage of munitions by member nations.[9]  To remedy these issues, the US military had to provide more ISR assets and targeting professionals than originally planned and had to front additional costs to replace the munitions stockpile.

In this speech, Gates stressed another weakness in NATO – an uneven distribution of responsibility.  In addition to pointing at some failures, Gates highlighted a few countries in the same speech, including Norway and Denmark, as members who were contributing more than their allies.  He remarked, “[those two countries] provided 12 percent of allied strike aircraft yet [had] struck about one third of the targets.”[10]  His overall message was clear: “[in NATO, there are] those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.”[11]  When Secretary Gates left his position in the Department of Defense, he expressed his frustrations with the members of NATO, saying some countries primarily reap its benefits, while others contribute more than their fair share.  Along with a wide range of commentators, Gates pointed at the failures of the alliance and, more importantly, highlighted that those failures will not enable NATO to be successful in the future, should a larger conflict than Libya arise, unless improvements are made.

NATO must reaffirm its mission and improve its interoperability to overcome its shortcomings.  The upcoming Chicago summit is a venue where issues such as NATO’s overall lack of assets, training, certified personnel, and insufficient financial contributions should be addressed.  The core values of NATO and the positive impact on both its members and nonmembers are too important to abandon because of recoverable shortages.  The core values of democracy, market economy, and mutual respect promote peace and economic growth with its partners.  With NATO continuing its five operational missions – most notably in Afghanistan – in accord with other nations, promoting these values and demonstrating its successes are invaluable as a continuing model alliance for the international community.  With today’s economic and security challenges, nations subscribing to the values and benefits of NATO cannot place their obligations to their partner states as a last priority.  The hardships that states are facing will pass in time, but the treaty organization will persevere well into the future, and NATO members must make their commitment a top national priority.

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[1] “The North Atlantic Treaty.” NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_17120.htm (accessed April 1, 2012).

[2] Ibid.

[3] “Chapter Four: Europe.” The Military Balance 112, no. 1 (07 Mar 2012): 71-76.

[4] ISAF maintains a force of over 130,000 troops from 50 countries, including 27 NATO countries, in Afghanistan.  KFOR is comprised of 29 countries, 22 NATO countries and seven supplemental state contributors.   Since 2004, Israel, Morocco, Russia, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, and Georgia have augmented NATO’s Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, through informal partnerships, liaison, or ship deployments or other physical assets.   12 Countries augment NATO in their other maritime operation, OCEAN SHIELD.   The African Union (AU) does not have a legal framework for their partnership with NATO, but the organization has been augmenting AU missions, mostly in Somalia, since 2005.

[5] “NATO operations and missions.” NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ topics_52060.htm (accessed April 6, 2012).

[6] John Finney and Ivo Šlaus, Assessing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Role of Independent Scientists (Northwestern University: IOS Press BV, 2010), 30.

[7] Doyle, Michael. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.

[8] Robert, Gates. “The Security and Defense Agenda (future of Nato).” Speeches. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 (accessed April 1, 2012).

[9] Ibid.

[10] Robert, Gates. “The Security and Defense Agenda (future of Nato).” Speeches. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 (accessed April 1, 2012).

[11] Ibid.

NATO: Misrepresented and Misunderstood

By Mark Ducasse, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

With NATO’s Chicago Summit just over two weeks away, the build-up has been both fascinating and disappointing. As a relative newbie to the workings of NATO, I have been amazed by the Alliance’s inability to convey its successes to the American public. If the American public does not realize the benefits of being part of NATO, the Alliance will be increasingly perceived as an unnecessary burden, a drain on U.S. resources in a time of scarcity, and could very easily become a target for cuts by U.S. politicians, even beyond the reduction of U.S. forces deployed in Europe announced by the Pentagon earlier this year.

The Alliance can no longer afford to ignore public opinion, especially during an American election year when foreign policy is relegated to a low priority. Both Democrats and Republicans are clambering over each other, utilizing wag-the-dog style politics in an effort to steal a minimal lead over their opponents. With the NATO Summit being held in President Barack Obama’s hometown of Chicago, Illinois, between the 20th and 21st of May, it is already overly politicized.

Given this situation, three key questions have continued to boggle my mind. First, why did NATO agree to hold its biggest political event in Chicago during a U.S. election year? Second, why did NATO agree to hold its Summit back-to-back with the G-8 Summit and potentially link itself to the mass protests of the anti-globalization and Occupy crowds such G-8 events always attract?[*] And third, why hasn’t NATO been bombarding the American public with non-technocratic information about the Alliance and its successes, instead of wasting its limited resources preaching to the converted about “capability gaps” and “Smart Defense”? If your head were being placed under the guillotine, you would not talk to your executioner about wood and metal care products; you would be loudly professing your innocence and calling every available witness to testify to your high moral standing.

The Alliance should distance itself from the quagmire that is domestic U.S. politics, and demonstrate its strategic importance to the citizens it protects instead of becoming a pawn for politicians who have their own agendas, decidedly different from promoting transatlantic relations. NATO especially requires the support of the American public. After all, the United States is the world’s only remaining superpower. The United States is key to everything that NATO does. In short, no American support, no NATO. But to garner this critical body of American support, NATO’s public relations machine needs to be spreading the good word of the Alliance’s continued relevance in maintaining the national security and international standing of the United States.

As a European living in the United States and working in the realm of policy, I have realized that public diplomacy, strategic vision, and concise justifications are scantily held skill-sets among Europeans. Perhaps this stems from the differences in working cultures, political systems, or simple confidence? Who knows? The point is that NATO’s public relations machine has done little in the build-up to Chicago to counter with fact and logic the plethora of thumb-sucking articles from shortsighted political commentators with banal titles such as, “Whither NATO,” or “The End of the Alliance.”

Memories are also short, too short. Not many Americans recall the first and only time that NATO’s Article 5 commitment was invoked – the famous three-musketeer clause of the NATO’s founding Washington Treaty that reads, “…an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all…” happened the day following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and Article 5 was not invoked by the United States to support Europe – as was originally foreseen – but the other way around: Europeans and Canadians coming to America’s aid!

Every one of the NATO’s members rallied to the aid of their stricken ally, which included the active securing of U.S. airspace against the possibility of another attack. Under the auspices of Operation Eagle Assist, NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft flew more than 360 operational sorties over the United States between October 2001 and May 2002, ready to identify and if need be to summon fighter aircraft to America’s rescue if there were any follow-on threats.

Then there was Hurricane Katrina in 2005. NATO and its partner countries responded to the United States’ request for assistance with offers of food, medical supplies, and equipment following the hurricane’s devastation. Every single allied nation is also fighting in Afghanistan, not necessarily out of national interest or priorities, but out of allied solidarity and their nations’ desire to engage and partner with the United States.

In short, NATO is a force multiplier – and indeed, a security multiplier – as well as a forum for international legitimation the United States cannot do without.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Alliance has continued to play an essential role in transatlantic security. It has intervened in conflicts to bring an end to ethnic violence and genocide, enforced United Nations Security Council resolutions, stabilized and rehabilitated nations, fought against terrorism, brought former adversaries into the flock of Western democratic States, and allowed for security and stability to be taken as a given, a necessary underpinning to development and prosperity.

We cannot and must not let such an alliance be misrepresented and misunderstood any longer. That is NATO’s real task between now and 20thMay in Chicago.

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[*] The G-8 Summit was originally proposed to be held back-to-back with the NATO Summit in Chicago. The G-8 Summit has now been moved to Camp David, in part to avoid the risk of popular demonstrations in Chicago and the media’s memories of the 1968 Chicago riots during the Democratic National Convention.

The United States “Pivot to Asia”: It’s NATO way or the highway

By Stefano Santamato, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

The closer we get to the NATO Summit in Chicago, next May 20 and 21, the more European Allies and Atlanticists become worried about the United States “pivot to Asia.”  This is producing a degree of questioning in Europe about US steadfastness that has few if any precedents.

Every speech, every statement, every policy memo by U.S. government officials is finely combed in search of references to NATO or to Europe. As regularly happens on the eve of every major NATO event, the “relevance” debate is dusted off the shelves of transatlantic opinion makers and think tanks. Word counts are run to calculate how many times the Alliance or the Old Continent are mentioned in US official documents and in the US media as if the sheer articulation of these names would equal interest, regard or significance. In doing so, however, we confuse relevance with visibility, substance with narrative, demonstrating an Atlanto-centric vision of the strategic environment that is no more.

To begin with, let us be clear on the difference between policy and slogans. While “pivot to Asia” is an effective and evocative catchphrase, it is not accurate in describing the evolution of the United States defense policy. The Strategic Guidance Review unveiled last January specifically refers to the necessity to “re-balance” towards the Asia-Pacific region. Webster dictionary’s definition of (re)balance is to “arrange so that one set of elements equals another”. Equals, not overtakes or replaces. Coincidentally, NATO is also the only alliance mentioned in a document that refers heavily to working with partners and allies. Hardly a verdict of irrelevance.

Truth to be told, many European Allies are more concerned about the risk of reduced U.S. leadership in NATO than of a reduced U.S. military presence on the Continent, itself now underway. After all, when it comes to wider security issues, the United States still remains the glue that keeps Europeans together. And make no mistake: the President of the United States is doubtless well aware of this fact, and in Chicago he will surely reiterate the U.S. commitment to Europe and the importance of NATO in substantive and no uncertain terms.

But Europeans should also realize that what the “pivot to Asia” may mean in terms of Europe’s lost geographical prominence could be more than compensated of in terms of relative weigh in the transatlantic relationship. There are at least four reasons why the United States’ increasing focus on the Asia-Pacific region is an opportunity for Europe to redefine the North Atlantic Alliance on the basis of shared missions and shared responsibilities, without renouncing the transatlantic security bond.

First, between failed North Korean missiles launches and the long-term military growth of China, most of the immediate geo-strategic challenges to the United States are still well-anchored to the arch spanning East Africa through the Middle-East to Central Asia. The only way that the United States can afford to pivot to Asia is to make sure that its European allies remain closer and more engaged than ever in these areas that remain of critical importance to the U.S.

Second, coalition operations in the past twenty years, from Desert Storm to Operation Unified Protector in Libya, demonstrate that the only way the United States and its partners – including from the Middle East and Asia – can operate together, is by following NATO doctrines, procedures, and standards. To move away from this template would be like trying to switch from digital to analog communications. It is always a feasible alternative, but at what cost in terms of efficiency and effectiveness?

Third, in an age of fiscal austerity, NATO’s education, training and exercise facilities and programs have the unique potential for maintaining, improving, and expanding allies’ and partners’ ability to work together, while minimizing or even zeroing new investment costs.

Fourth and possibly most important, Afghanistan teaches us that NATO is the only alliance in modern history that has demonstrated the capability for enduring over ten years of military conflict without falling apart politically – indeed, while and even attracting new partners.

For these and other reasons, NATO and its European members should not worry overmuch about the narrative of the United States’ pivot to Asia. Rather, they should welcome the substance of a strategic shift that will guarantee NATO’s continued relevance for years to come, not because of its geography or its place in the pecking order of U.S. priorities, but because of its ultimate proven value. After all, unless the United States adopts a doctrine of strict isolationism and military unilateralism, meeting its strategic needs indeed means the “NATO way or the highway;” — never mind if the Alliance is not a big topic in speeches or the media. Maybe, in fact, this quiet reality of its critical importance to the United States is exactly what NATO needs.

Lords of Dharamraja: A New Vector for Disinformation and a Call for an Organizational Response

By Fletcher Schoen, Research Assistant
Edited by Dr. Christopher Lamb, Distinguished Research Fellow

In January, 2012, a ‘hacktivist’ group called “The Lords of Dharamraja” released information obtained by penetrating the secure servers at the Indian embassy in Paris.[1] One document was a memo detailing a purported deal between the Indian government and the international telecom firms Apple, Nokia, and Research in Motion. The companies allegedly provided Indian intelligence agencies with a technical backdoor into their mobile devices like the ubiquitous Blackberry or iPhone in return for greater access to the Indian telecom market.  Indian Military Intelligence utilized this backdoor to read the emails of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), a bipartisan panel that reports to Congress on the security and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.[2]  The USCC has not denied that it was the victim of a cyber attack and it has asked the FBI, the lead agency on cybercrime inside the United States, to begin an investigation. The investigation however is not concentrating on Indian intelligence, despite the memo.  The origins of the attack are not what they seem.

At first glance, the memo seems genuine. It has an official layout, some redacted text, and is consistent with Indian bureaucratic language.[3] But according to the Times of India, which interviewed a number of Indian military and intelligence sources, the memo is replete with inaccuracies.  The most glaring is the wrong agency logo at the top of the page.[4]  The letterhead and signature block were lifted from authentic documents but the signatories do not work for the organization that produced the document.  Other sources familiar with Indian Intelligence said text is never redacted in internal documents.[5]  Finally, the Directorate General of Military Intelligence (Foreign Division) deals with defense attachés and foreign military cooperation not signals intelligence.[6] The Times of India’s conclusions are backed by investigations undertaken by The Guardian and Reuters.  All three investigative reports agree the memo is most certainly a forgery.

Recent reports about the ongoing FBI investigation further undermine the memo’s authenticity. American sources say the e-mails were stolen as part of the first stages of a “blended attack” on the USCC rather than alleged Indian signals interception of USCC communications.[7]  Blended attacks involve finding email servers that regularly communicate with the main target but have relatively lax cyber security.  Hacking them can eventually provide access to the harder to infiltrate main networks. Most of the stolen emails came not from the more secure USCC servers but from the personal email account of a former USCC Chairman, William Reinsch, who now heads the pro-trade organization, The National Foreign Trade Commission.  American officials with knowledge of the investigation point out that it is much more likely that hackers associated with Chinese rather than Indian interests would know who Reinsch was and would bother taking the time to track him down.  In any case, the intrusion into Reinsch’s email suggests some third party unconnected with Indian Intelligence committed this cyber attack against the USCC.

Hackers have always taken great care to hide the electronic and national origins of their attacks but this forged memo demonstrates that defensive misdirects can become offensive information warfare tools. Cyber attacks and the subsequent revealing of stolen data can act as a means for disseminating disinformation in a manner that compounds the damage done by the release of sensitive information. The size of a massive electronic data theft would make it difficult to sort out what was real and what wasn’t and the sensitivity of the real documents would make commenting on the fakes a delicate undertaking for the U.S. government. The effects of this kind of attack can be extrapolated from this recent incident. The forged Indian memo was just one document and yet it managed to morph a relatively routine cyber attack into an uncomfortable supposition of espionage between allies that will only be sorted out through careful investigation. All the while the real perpetrators can continue their work.

Dealing with this kind of sophisticated attack in the future will require a coherent interagency approach that combines cyber security with counter-disinformation and strategic communications.  Unfortunately, the response to this cyber attack and forgery has been anything but coherent.  The lack of comment by the FBI about its ongoing investigation is understandable only because revealing details of the attack gives free damage assessment to its adversaries. However the lack of any government response to the forgery is troubling. An information vacuum allows the forgery to have its intended effect. Forgeries like this one are relatively easy to expose and may seem relatively unimportant, but if ignored, over time such disinformation will erode and seriously damage U.S. political relationships.

Sources inside the U.S. government have told me that the United States has a counter-disinformation capability, but I have yet to see an official denunciation of this forgery and it is unclear if the alleged capability is working with the FBI on countering the new cyber vector for disinformation.  This should change, and quickly.  After all, this is not the first time the United States has confronted state-sponsored disinformation on a large scale.  During the last decade of the Cold War the State Department led an interagency working group that became adept at dealing with the Soviet Union’s frequent use of forged U.S. government documents.  Despite spending nearly $300 million on their disinformation apparatus, Soviet forgeries never withstood official American scrutiny and denunciation. Eventually an exasperated Soviet leadership foreswore the use of disinformation.

As China increases its cyber attacks on the United States it would be safe to assume the use of disinformation to support these attacks will increase as well.  China’s political system gives it monolithic control over information management but the United States and its open society retain the supreme advantage in information warfare.  Open expression of ideas will always triumph over manufactured information—eventually.  In the meantime, we need to energize the organizations that can convert this advantage into a concrete response.

Fletcher Schoen is a research assistant with INSS and co-author of “Deception, Disinformation and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group made a Major Difference,” a forthcoming study on the Active Measures Working Group to be published by NDU Press. 

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[1] Yatish Yadev, “Hackers Invade Server of Indian Embassy in Paris,”  December 17, 2011. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/servers-of-indian-embassy-in-paris-hacked/1/164664.html

[2] The USCC also provides “recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action.” http://www.uscc.gov/

[3] Frank Jack Daniel “Fake Memo but real code?  Indian-U.S. Hacking Mystery Deepens.” January 12, 2012.

[4] Charles Arthur and Agencies, “US Accuses China of Hacking emails,” The Guardian, January 20, 2012.

[5] Mark Hosenball, “US probes Commission Hack ,” Reuters, January 10, 2012.

[6] Josey Joseph, “Fake Letter Blows lid off Hacker’s Espionage Claim,” The Times of India, January 12, 2012.

[7] Charles Arthur and Agencies, “US Accuses China of Hacking emails”  The Guardian, January 20, 2012.

More than Partners, not quite Allies – The “NATO Association”: a proposal for the Chicago Summit.

By Stefano Santamato
Center for Transatlantic Security Studies

In an article published in the NATO Review in March 2008, the late Ron Asmus wrote, “In the 1990s, NATO’s new partnerships were a key component of the Alliance’s reinvention for the post-Cold War era.”[1] Since then, partnerships involving the former Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites – Partnership-for-Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – as well as parts of North African and Middle East – such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – have become keystones of NATO’s strategy to project stability across the European continent and beyond. In the past twenty years, partnership frameworks and programs have evolved constantly, reflecting different degrees of integration (nine European Partners are now full NATO members) and of reciprocal strategic interest.

As the Alliance embraces the tenets of its new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, and as these relationships enter their third decade, the perception is that NATO partnerships should not just be renovated, but renewed altogether.

The need to identify a new form of partnership relations in NATO is the result of two converging factors. On one side, there is growing recognition that the original intent of NATO partnerships has exhausted its political, enlargement, and outreach thrust. This, in parallel with the growing involvement of “operational” partners in NATO operations – from KFOR (Kosovo) to ISAF (Afghanistan) to Libya – has de facto created a two-tier NATO partnership cadre. First are partners like Sweden, Australia, Finland, or South Korea, to name but few, that are considered and consider themselves to be net contributors to NATO’s “cooperative security” paradigm; second are partners that are only interested in the political stage and international legitimacy that NATO’s partnership programs bring to their respective governments and bureaucracies.

On the other side, the growing post-ISAF vision of a NATO focused on core activities has led a number of Allies, spearheaded by the United States, to look at NATO as the ultimate operational enabler. This view was voiced by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the December 2011 NATO Foreign Ministerial meeting, when the holding of a “special relationship” meeting at the Chicago Summit, with a yet to be identified core group of partners, was proposed. The idea envisions for a shift from geographically-based NATO partnerships towards more functionally related ones, placing a premium on the partners’ ability to contribute to NATO’s mandate and priorities. This shift is also aimed at removing – or rather contouring – the obstacles to a closer regional cooperation, e.g. Israel and the Mediterranean Dialogue or Russia and the EAPC, while preserving the self-differentiating nature of NATO’s partnership approach.

But there is also another important factor of the partnership equation that needs to be taken into account. The partners’ increased involvement in NATO operations has opened a “decision-making” debate in the Alliance. According to the NATO Political-Military Framework, which regulates partners’ participation in NATO-led operations, partners can only be involved in shaping decisions that, ultimately, will be taken only by Allies. This provision has created some frustration in many contributing partners, which see their troops and assets operating side-by-side with NATO forces, but which are not allowed to take part in NATO’s final deliberations on issues regarding, for instance, KFOR, ISAF or Operation Unified Protector.

To be honest, in practice partners’ influence in so-called ISAF-format or KFOR-format discussions goes well beyond mere decision-shaping. And NATO’s Comprehensive Approach has introduced a culture of increased inclusiveness. It is however true that granting full decision-making rights to operational partners would equate to the establishment of an á la carte NATO, in which partners would be allowed to pick and choose missions or activities while opting out of the Article 5 solidarity commitment.

Yet, this is an issue that needs to be addressed if NATO is to embrace a new concept of functional partnerships. A possible solution is the creation of a “NATO Association” that allows selected partners to move closer to the Alliance without committing to full membership for them. The initiative for such a NATO Association could be launched at the next Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government, to be held in Chicago (IL) on 20-21 May 2012.

The NATO Association should build on the three enabling pillars of the Alliance’s collective defense mandate — namely: a) defense planning, b) command and control, and c) standardization – and develop along specific functional areas or missions lines. Associated partners would not be able to participate to the policy making or in the management of the three pillars, but new decision-making mechanisms would allow their full involvement in activities such as operations planning, capability development, or training and education in the areas or missions of choice.

To begin with, Associated partners should focus on cooperation areas identified by NATO’s Smart Defense initiative, as well as on emerging security challenges such as cyber-defense, counter-terrorism or energy security. The NATO Association would be self-selective and organized along the principles of voluntary participation, active contribution and functional commitment.

In doing so, Allies and Associated partners would benefit from an input-driven and output-oriented relationship. The result would preserve the core of NATO’s Allies-only solidarity commitment while expanding it as a standard-setting, enabling platform. Ultimately, a NATO Association would provide a greater incentive to partners from various regions to cooperate and operate with the Alliance, either collectively or in coalition frameworks.  This would reinforce the vision of U.S. President Obama of NATO as a unique “force multiplier.”[2]

Stefano Santamato is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow for the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (NDU-INSS). Mr. Santamato may be contacted at s.santamato.ctr@ndu.edu. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

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[1] Ron Asmus: “Rethinking NATO Partnerships for the 21^st Century”, March 19, 2008. In NATO Review on line – http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2008/03/ART4/EN/index.htm.

[2] U.S. President Barack Obama press conference for the unveiling of the review of the U.S. Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense – January 5^th, 2012 – Source: BBC.co.uk

China’s 2012 Defense Budget: Steady As She Goes

Syrian Conflict: Lebanon at Risk

By Tess deBlanc-Knowles, Research Intern
Edited by Colonel Joel Rayburn, Military Research Fellow

Whether or not the Assad government survives the deepening current crisis, the explosion of violence and instability in Syria will have a serious impact on its neighbors and fundamentally alter regional dynamics.  As the world considers the potential regional fallout, international attention has tended to focus either on Iran or on the exacerbation of sectarian divisions in Iraq.  But civil war in Syria will also likely drag Lebanon into the fray and put devastating pressure on its fragile political framework.

In the face of Syrian unrest, the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Mikati has attempted to pursue a policy of determined neutrality in an effort to “disassociate” itself from the Syrian conflict.[1]  The government has attempted to insulate Lebanon from Syria’s instability by steering clear of both Arab League and international initiatives, declining to participate in sanctions against its neighbor or to play a role in the Arab League observer mission.  Most recently, the government declined the invitation to attend the “Friends of Syria” conference in Tunisia, citing “compliance with the country’s disassociation policy.”[2]

Beyond official statements, however, actors within Lebanon have begun jockeying to capitalize on Syria’s political disruption and the perceived waning of the Assad government’s power. Hezbollah’s March 8 coalition, for example, has clearly affirmed its support of the Assad government.  In recent speeches, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrullah downplayed the scale of the Syrian unrest, blaming the media for false reports and exaggerated casualty counts.  Nasrullah additionally cautioned that a new regime in Syria would increase the influence of both the United States and Israel.[3]

By contrast, leaders of the opposition March 14 coalition have declared support for “the will of Syrian the people” and the establishment of democracy in Syria.[4]  Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri has called for “solidarity with the Syrian people” and for international recognition of the opposition Syrian National Council.[5]  In a recent interview, Fares Soueid, the Secretary General of March 14, affirmed the coalition’s support of the SNC and boldly asserted, “the Syrian regime will most certainly fall down.”[6]

This polarization over Syria has touched even those who ostensibly occupy the neutral center of Lebanon’s political spectrum.  Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has participated publicly in anti-Assad rallies and has predicted that “the Syrian people’s revolution will win,”[7]  and has gone so far as to call for arming the Syrian opposition.[8]   President Michel Suleiman, similarly, appeared to side with the Syrian opposition when he declared in late February that “we, as friends of the Syrian people, hope that democracy will be established in Syria because if it is well, then Lebanon will be well.”[9]

Meanwhile, Lebanon’s domestic politics have ground to a halt.  Public fracturing of cabinet politicians along pro and anti-Syrian lines continues to raise tensions within government, stymieing compromise and hampering basic functioning.  Disagreements between pro-Assad Christian leader Michel Aoun and the anti-Assad opposition led to a four week suspension of cabinet sessions by Prime Minister Mikati last month.  While Mikati declared the crisis resolved following the resignation of a cabinet member from Aoun’s political bloc, the stalemate illustrated the now-continuous tensions between the coalitions, which have flared again over budgetary issues.[10]

Beyond politics, the spillover of Syria’s turmoil has led to unrest in the Lebanese street.  Large anti-Assad rallies have been held in the cities of Saida and Wali Khalid, and the Russian embassy in Beirut was the scene of impassioned rival demonstrations following Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council Resolution proposing a gradual turnover of power by Assad.[11]  Most recently, tensions exploded in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli – always a sectarian flashpoint – where clashes between pro-Assad Alawites and anti-Assad Sunnis left 3 dead and 23 wounded.[12]  Pro and anti-Assad rallies escalated into violent clashes, including the launching of rocket-propelled grenades from both sides.[13]  Reports of armed militias roaming the streets, explosions of machine gun fire, and targeted attacks on Lebanese Army personnel have flooded the Lebanese press.  Weekly anti-Assad protests organized by the Salafi Hizb Ut-Tahrir have followed the violence in the city, with protestors calling for jihad against the Assad government.[14]

The government responded to these incidents by dispatching the army to reestablish security.  The Lebanese Armed Forces have additionally been deployed, since the first week in February, along the northern border with Syria.  This deployment came at the request of the Syrian regime in response to growing Free Syrian Army activity in the area and the vocal condemnation by the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon of the smuggling of weapons across the border into Syria from its “brotherly state.”[15]  Such a deployment, ostensibly to maintain “security,” undermines Mikati’s neutrality policy and brings Lebanon a step closer to outright involvement in the conflict.  While Mikati has emphasized the deployment as an effort to protect the country’s borders, Hezbollah has indicated the importance of the army’s border presence as an impediment to the actions of Syrian sympathizers and to intercept the flow of weapons to the Syrian opposition.   Large numbers of refugees fleeing the violence, estimated by the UNHCR to number over 6000,[16] further add to the complex situation in the north.

Publicly, Hezbollah’s leaders have proclaimed their neutrality, asserting their commitment to maintaining Lebanon’s distance from the Syrian troubles.  For example, Deputy Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem declared that Hezbollah “will not allow Lebanon to be used as a platform to attack others or a conduit for settling political scores in order to execute Israeli and American projects.”[17]  By framing the statement in such a manner, Qassem attempted to position the organization with the disassociation stance of the government, albeit with a firm anti-western intervention message.  Meanwhile, in response to Prime Minister Mikati’s earlier suspension of the cabinet, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah publicly confirmed the organization’s support of the government, insisting that now “is not the appropriate time for overthrowing cabinets in Lebanon.”[18]  Nasrallah has voiced the opinion that Lebanon would be the first country affected by Syrian unrest, and has thus asserted Hezbollah’s commitment to the current Lebanese government and its attempts to provide stability and political security.

Reports from the ground, however, paint a different picture.  A number of sources have implicated Hezbollah in pro-Syrian activities in the border areas, including the tracking down of opposition leaders,[19] the training of snipers, and the involvement of Iranian intelligence officers.[20]  More recently. The Free Syrian Army condemned the alleged involvement of Hezbollah armed brigades, along with Iranian Revolutionary Guards, in supporting the Syrian regime.[21]

In its public rhetoric, Hezbollah has endeavored to transfer blame for Lebanese instability to the actions of March 14, while simultaneously shifting the focus to the threat of Israel and Hezbollah’s critical role as a bulwark against it.  Hezbollah has positioned itself as pro-Assad, but also pro-disassociation, launching rhetorical attacks at its March 14 rivals, accusing them of arming the Syrian opposition and of attempting to use the Syrian uprising as an avenue for political gain.[22]  Senior Hezbollah official, Nabil Qaouk, warned March 14 against such steps, asserting that “the resistance today is at its strongest and is prepared to bring down a great catastrophe upon Israel.”[23]  Following the anti-Assad speeches of March 14 leaders Saad Hariri and Amin Gemayal, Nasrallah asserted the opposition alliance was “plunging Lebanon into war.”[24]

In fairness, the fact that Hezbollah itself is guilty of what it accuses March 14 of doing does not mean that March 14 is entirely innocent.  There is ample evidence that some March 14 elements do, at a minimum, have the intent of helping to arm the Syrian opposition, as Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea recently implied in his call to all countries to act decisively to stop the murder of Syrian civilians.[25]  And a recent explosion at an arms warehouse in Tripoli may have involved a Future Movement cache intended for arming the Syrian opposition.[26]

Thus the stage is set for Syria’s violence to spill over into Lebanon.  Lebanese politics have become deeply polarized, rival Lebanese factions are likely providing material support to the opposing Syrian sides, and the tension is already causing armed clashes within Lebanese borders.  Of course, the collapse of the Assad government would bring with it the danger of a security vacuum in any case.  Such a dynamic would have the strong likelihood of pushing Syria over the precipice into full-blown civil war, an occurrence that would send shockwaves through the delicate sectarian and security stability of the region as a whole.  Civil war in Syria would almost certainly complete the unraveling of Lebanon’s shaky confessional political system and plunge it back into civil war, and thus,  as the crisis in Syria worsens, the issue of the Assad government’s survival will eventually imperil the survival of the Lebanese government as well.  For Lebanon, to not follow a policy of disassociation would indeed be, as Prime Minister Mikati has declared, “suicidal.”[27]  But the influx of Syrian refugees, the escalation of political struggles, the polarization of the political parties, and the eruption of popular violence seem to indicate that this is a policy that has already failed.

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[1] “Mikati , in Paris, Says France Understands Lebanon’s Syria Sensitivities.”  Daily Star 10 Feb 2012

[2] “Lebanon to Miss ‘Friends of Syria Conference.”  Daily Star 21 Feb 2012

[3] Nasrallah, Hassan.   Sayyid Al-Shuhada Complex, Beirut, Lebanon.  7 Feb. 2012.

[4] “We are with the Syrian People as a whole and support the democratic option, and this is included in the proposal of the Syrian leadership”  An Nahar  30 Jan 2012.

[5]  “Lebanese Press Round-Up: February 15, 2012” NOW Lebanon 15 Feb 2012

[6]  Interview with Fares Soueid.  Al Arabiyya Television,  Dubai 16 Feb 2012

[7] “Jumblatt Joins Anti-Syrian Regime Protest in Beirut” NOW Lebanon 22 Feb 2012

[8] “Jumblatt Calls for ‘Arming Syrian Opposition’” NOW Lebanon 25 Feb 2012

[9] “Suleiman: Some Flaws Need to Be Addressed to Fortify Taef Accord”  Naharnet  24 Feb 2012.

[10] “Mikati, Suleiman Emerge Winners in Deal to End Cabinet Crisis”  Daily Star 24 Feb 2012

[11] “Rival Demonstrators Face Off at Russian Embassy”  Daily Star 6 Feb 2012

[12] “Syrian Violence Spills Over Into Lebanon.”  Al Jazeera  12 Feb. 2012

[13] “Syrian Violence Spills Over Into Lebanon.”  Al Jazeera  12 Feb. 2012.

[14] “The Syrian Uprising in the Eyes of  Lebanese Islamists”  Al Akhbar  29 Feb 2012 .

[15] “Mikati, Syria’s Envoy Discuss Arm’s Smuggling.”  Daily Star 18 Jan 2012.

[16] Noor Malas and Charles Levinson, “Syrian Conflict Spills to Neighbors.”  Wall Street Journal 18 Feb 2012.

[17] “Lebanon Won’t Be Used To Hit Arab States: Hezbollah.”  Daliy Star  13 Feb. 2012.

[18]  “Nasrallah: Time Not ‘Appropriate for Overthrowing Cabinets.’”  NOW Lebanon  7 Feb. 2012.

[19] Mortada, Radwan. “Wadi Khalid: The Free Syrian Army Base in Lebanon”  Al Akhbar  8 Feb 2012.

[20] Amar Al-Wawi.  Interview by Hedi Aouidj.  Owni.  20 Feb 2012.  Web.

[21] “Snc Military Commander: Iranian, Hezbollah Brigades Fighting With Assad Forces”  NOW Lebanon 1 March 2012

[22] “Hezbollah Warns March 14 not to wager on Political Change.”  Daily Star 21 Feb 2012

[23] “Hezbollah Warns March 14 not to wager on Political Change.”  Daily Star 21 Feb 2012

[24] “Future Block Says Nasrallah’s Speech Was ‘Negative.’”  NOW Lebanon 21 Feb 2012.

[25] “Geagea: A Democratic Syria Ends ‘Exportation of Terrorism”  NOW Lebanon 14 Feb 2012.

[26] “Tripoli Clashes and the Neo-Salafis”  Al Akhbar  20 Feb 2012.

[27] Rizk, Sibylle.  “Lebanon is Certainly Not an Organized Platform for Arms Exports to Syria.”  Le Figaro 10 Feb 2012

The Failure of Diaspora Elites and Implications for the Syrian Crisis

By Michael Lynch, Research Intern, Center for Strategic Research
Edited by Dr. Denise Natali, CSR

Many would argue that the Arab Spring failed. This assumption of a squandered movement is largely based on differing perceptions of what the Arab Spring sought to bring about. If one were expecting liberal secular democracies emerging in the Middle-East, then disappointment is certain.

The reality is that the Arab Spring was never about democracy. It was about overthrowing the government that the general populous perceived as ailing them. Any confusion lies in the rhetoric of the leaders that emerged during the revolution and suggested that they were the champions of the movement. What seems to repeat itself is that in a power vacuum diaspora elites, who have been residing in the west until the uprisings, emerge from the political rubble and return home touting ambitions of western style democracy and governance. As the dust settles, the reality of the situation on the ground is much different than as advertised.

This emergence of diaspora leaders and their subsequent failures occur for several nearly universal reasons. The new leaders were educated in the west, speak very good English, and dress as proper western elites. The familiarity is comforting. These elites tell the US and its officials exactly what they want to hear. These propositions are the fantasies of a pro-west, democratic, and most importantly economically liberalized new state.

The problem; however, is that  that these leaders may have the backing of western institutions but, they have little or no legitimacy on the ground. They did not fight alongside the revolutionaries, they did not endure the hardships under the former leader, and when they grew tired of their situation, they abandoned their homeland only to return at a rather opportunistic time.

The crisis of elite legitimacy was the case not just during the Arab Spring but also in the reconstruction of Iraq and most post-conflict state building operations. (see;Afghanistan). Maliki and Allawai fled Iraq only to return after the invasion and other prominent figures have tended to go to schools in Western Europe. They are the antithesis to Muqtada al-Sadr, a Islamist and arguably militant leader who is from Baghdad, fought against western forces, and oversees several massive social programs in the slums of Iraq, which are now known as Sadr city.

This scenario has repeated itself in the aftermath of Arab Spring where exiled, traditionally western educated men, have returned to oversee the new government. Specific examples include:

• Moncef Marzouki- Interim Tunisian President, fled to France in 2002. Studied medicine in Paris

• Moncef Marzouki- Egyptian Opposition Leader possible presidential candidate, returned from Vienna where he was director of IAEA, Doctorate in International Law New York University

• Abdurrahim al-Keib- Libyan Prime Minister, former engineering professor at University of Washington

• Burhan Ghalioun- President of Syrian National Counsel, professor University of Paris Sorbonne

These diaspora leaders will not become the power brokers in the country for several reasons.  First, they are not able to distance themselves far enough from the former regime. While many had been long time activists, it appears longevity of polite resistance (op-eds in the New York Times) does not garner respect from the general populous in the Souks.  Rather, what the movements that did manage to gain the most momentum appear to the embodiment of the opposite ideology of the former regime.  In Tunisia and Egypt, formerly outlawed Islamist parties replaced secular, pro-western, modern, and highly militarized governments. In Libya, Ghadaffi’s rival tribal region Cyrenaica ousted him and the rest of his emplaced Tripolitania elites.

In each case, the opposition movement rallied around a direct opposing identity. Looking to throw off the shackles of the past and begin a new more prosperous era, they distanced themselves from the former system. This has happened in the Middle-East before, yet in the opposite direction. When Mustafa Kemal and the Young Turks ousted the Ottoman Empire, they wanted to establish a new governance that was as anti-Ottoman. Kemal replaced the Arabic script, moved the capitol from Istanbul and its Islamic architecture, and installed an entrenched secular ideology that still exists (however eroding) today.

The most prominent voice of the Syrian opposition movement is the Syrian National Counsel. The group was formed in Turkey, is composed of western elites, and was first conferred international legitimacy in Tunisia. The recognition of the SNC at the Friends of Syria Conference is problematic in itself. One would assume that the revolutionary factions would be too busy fighting in the streets of Damascus or under siege in Homs to take an international flight to attend a conference in at the La Palace hotel in Tunis.

The militant opposition, the Free Syrian Army, is also disadvantaged. First, it has no connection to the SNC, despite the SNC’s claims. The FSA is more of a network of lightly armed revolutionaries rather than an army as its name suggests. It has neither organizational hierarchy nor method of command and control. Unlike the armed opposition in Libya, the FSA lacks control over a geographic space and lacks a strategic stronghold like a Benghazi. Therefore when the question emerges about arming the opposition, it appears there is no consolidated military opposition to arm.

As the UN, United States, and other Western governments examine their options in Syria, there is a significant push to aid the Syrian opposition. The amount of fault lines the outcome of this conflict has is enormous.  It is a situation that will not just affect the Syrian people but the entire region.  It is worth noting that these perceived simple solutions such as “No-Kill Zones” or “Buffer Zones” or every ones favorite “Technical and Humanitarian Support” are never simple.  These simple plans never seem to include a “what happens next” (see; Afghanistan) or contingency guidelines.

It should be worth noting that the staple of low level conflict, a truck mounted machine gun known as a “technical”, got its name from aid workers in Africa arming militants using “technical assistance” grants.  Until there is a more unified and identifiable opposition as well as solidified power sharing agreements on what comes after Assad, the US needs to be cautious.

While the situation in Syria is grim, we need be weary that any misstep by the international community could escalate the situation to levels of violence far beyond what they are now. Any action in Syria risks crossing the Rubicon of Damascus.

Ideology vs Pragmatism: Saddam’s Advice for Cuba

By Michael C. Herrera, Research Intern, CRRC

Many Americans view Saddam Hussein as an ideological dictator.  Emerging evidence from captured Iraqi records stored digitally at the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), however, confirms the conclusion that Saddam was first and foremost a pragmatist.  Research by notable scholars, like Amatzia Baram, highlights Saddam’s willingness to adapt his behavior and his regime to gain an advantage.  For example, in 1993, when Iraq felt the full effects of the international embargo, Saddam announced the opening of his Faith Campaign, which would transform Iraq’s secular state to a more Islamic state in concert with the growing religiosity among Iraqis.  This ability to adapt in order to preserve power was continually employed by Saddam throughout his 24-year reign as President of Iraq.  One can further observe his pragmatism in a CRRC transcript of a 2001 meeting between Saddam and Ricardo Largone, President of the National Cuban Association, where they discuss Cuba’s recent economic turmoil (CRRC Record Number SH-PDWN-D-000-507).

From the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s until 2001, Cuba’s economy struggled. Tourism remained its primary source of income, while sugar cane production steadily decreased due to a shortage of replacement parts, fertilizers, pesticides, and petroleum, as well as an unmotivated workforce. Largone voiced these concerns during his meeting with Saddam, who urges Cuba to consider adopting a new, more capitalist, approach.

Saddam begins by first identifying the problem with Cuba’s agricultural collective system.  He states that when a farmer owns his own plot of land he has a higher incentive to care for his crop.  The farmer will ensure a good harvest if it feeds his chickens and cows, which, in turn, feed his family.  Consequently, the sense of ownership creates a cooperative amongst his family where everyone, even a child of six years old, will work on the farm.  Saddam continues:

“However, with a collective this does not happen, if a family member finds work that gives him a little extra, he takes it, as for the wife, she does not work in the fields because she has no share in the cooperative. And the farmer feeds his cow sugar cane secretly because the cow is his and the sugar cane belongs to a hundred other people, and the property is public, it is all there, but the quantity of sugar cane is not specifically known.”

Saddam attributes the lack of sugar production to the theory that, because workers do not own the land, they are more likely to steal from it and less likely to work hard to increase production. He goes on to describe how, over time, the Cuban population has grown out of their initial acceptance of the socialist command economy:

“At the beginning, when the Cuban revolution occurred and succeeded in 1959, the Cuban people were poor, with their dignity and nationalism stepped on. At that time if you told him he had one share out of ten, he accepted it because he had nothing else. So, he worked hard and was buoyed by the spirit of the new revolution so he was careful, enthusiastic and responsible with the country’s wealth as if it were his own, but after his stomach was full, and he was clothed, well, he started to look for a new kind of life… Now, he sees the government employee, busy with  the news of all the other employees, this one stole and this one abuses public funds and this one skipped work for a few hours because he is a party member. And he sees the occupation in movies and how the American family lives, and he sees the cars or hears about them, but he must live in his country. And if imperialism is as bad as he is told, he does not see those negatives… These generations seek a better situation and secretly, within their hearts, compare their condition and the condition of other systems that took a different road.”

According to Saddam, the new era of information had led Cubans to seek a better socioeconomic situation. At this point we begin to see Saddam’s pragmatism emerge. After identifying Cuba’s problem, Saddam proposes that Cuba consider adapting to its new situation to increase production. He states, “Therefore, if you lease out the land for a high price, that is appropriate for the income, then you will see that the production will double or more.” He is proposing that Cuba move to a more capitalist system.  Much like China has done over the past few years, Saddam stresses that Cuba should rethink the communist model and slowly make an attempt to move toward owning and farming private property.

It seems as though Cuba has begun to show the same pragmatism that kept Saddam in power. In the past couple of years, Cuba has begun to allow its citizens to own small businesses, it has given farmers new profit-incentives, and even allowed for ownership of private property. Although there are still many restriction imposed by the state, Cuba has begun to take Saddam’s pragmatic approach and learned to adapt to save its ailing economy. Analysts seeking to understand the durability of dictatorial rule in Cuba, Saddam’s Iraq, and elsewhere would do well to pay attention to dictators’ pragmatic behavior, not merely their ideological expressions.

Ideology vs Pragmatism: Saddam’s Advice for Cuba

By Michael C. Herrera and David Palkki
Conflict Records Research Center

Many Americans view Saddam Hussein as an ideological dictator. Emerging evidence from captured Iraqi records stored digitally at the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), however, confirms the conclusion that Saddam was first and foremost a pragmatist. Research by notable scholars, like Amatzia Baram, highlights Saddam’s willingness to adapt his behavior and his regime to gain advantage. For example, in 1993, when Iraq felt the full effects of the international embargo, Saddam announced the opening of his Faith Campaign, which would transform Iraq’s secular state to a more Islamic state in concert with the growing religiosity among Iraqis.[i] This ability to adapt in order to preserve power was continually employed by Saddam throughout his 24-year reign as President of Iraq. One can further observe his pragmatism in a CRRC transcript of a 2001 meeting between Saddam and Ricardo Largone, President of the National Cuban Association, where they discuss Cuba’s recent economic turmoil.

From the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s until 2001, Cuba’s economy struggled. Tourism remained its primary source of income, while sugar cane production steadily decreased due to a shortage of replacement parts, fertilizers, pesticides, and petroleum, as well as an unmotivated workforce. Largone voiced these concerns during his meeting with Saddam, who urges Cuba to consider adopting a new, more capitalist, approach.

Saddam begins by first identifying the problem with Cuba’s agricultural collective system. He states that when a farmer owns his own plot of land he has a higher incentive to care for his crop. The farmer will ensure a good harvest if it feeds his chickens and cows, which, in turn, feed his family. Consequently, the sense of ownership creates a cooperative amongst his family where everyone, even a child of six years old, will work on the farm.  Saddam continues:

However, with a collective this does not happen, if a family member finds work that gives him a little extra, he takes it, as for the wife, she does not work in the fields because she has no share in the cooperative. And the farmer feeds his cow sugar cane secretly because the cow is his and the sugar cane belongs to a hundred other people, and the property is public, it is all there, but the quantity of sugar cane is not specifically known.[ii]

Saddam attributes the lack of sugar production to the theory that, because workers do not own the land, they are more likely to steal from it and less likely to work hard to increase production. He goes on to describe how, over time, the Cuban population has grown out of their initial acceptance of the socialist command economy:

At the beginning, when the Cuban revolution occurred and succeeded in 1959, the Cuban people were poor, with their dignity and nationalism stepped on. At that time if you told him he had one share out of ten, he accepted it because he had nothing else. So, he worked hard and was buoyed by the spirit of the new revolution so he was careful, enthusiastic and responsible with the country’s wealth as if it were his own, but after his stomach was full, and he was clothed, well, he started to look for a new kind of life… Now, he sees the government employee, busy with  the news of all the other employees, this one stole and this one abuses public funds and this one skipped work for a few hours because he is a party member. And he sees the occupation in movies and how the American family lives, and he sees the cars or hears about them, but he must live in his country. And if imperialism is as bad as he is told, he does not see those negatives… These generations seek a better situation and secretly, within their hearts, compare their condition and the condition of other systems that took a different road.[iii]

According to Saddam, the new era of information had led Cubans to seek a better socioeconomic situation. At this point we begin to see Saddam’s pragmatism emerge. After identifying Cuba’s problem, Saddam proposes that Cuba consider adapting to its new situation to increase production. He states, “Therefore, if you lease out the land for a high price, that is appropriate for the income, then you will see that the production will double or more.”[iv] He is proposing that Cuba move to a more capitalist system.  Much like China has done over the past few years, Saddam stresses that Cuba should rethink the communist model and slowly make an attempt to move toward owning and farming private property.

It seems as though Cuba has begun to show the same pragmatism that kept Saddam in power. In the past couple of years, Cuba has begun to allow its citizens to own small businesses, it has given farmers new profit-incentives, and even allowed for ownership of private property. Although there are still many restriction imposed by the state, Cuba has begun to take Saddam’s pragmatic approach and learned to adapt to save its ailing economy. Analysts seeking to understand the durability of dictatorial rule in Cuba, Saddam’s Iraq, and elsewhere would do well to pay attention to dictators’ pragmatic behavior, not merely their ideological expressions.

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[i] Baram, Amatzia. “From Militant Secularism to Islamism: The Iraqi Ba’th Regime 1968-2003”. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/histroy-and-public-policy-program

[ii] All quotes from Saddam Hussein are taken from the collection at the Conflict Records Research Center, Number: SH-PDWN-D-000-507

[iii] CRRC: SH-PDWN-D-000-507

[iv] CRRC: SH-PDWN-D-000-507

Michael C. Herrera is currently finishing his bachelor’s degree at Johns Hopkins University.  He is in the Army National Guard and is a research intern at the Conflict Records Research Center.

David Palkki is the Deputy Director of the Conflict Records Research Center and hasa recently co-authored a book titled”The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001.”